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It has been 56 years since Newfoundland and Labrador became Canada’s tenth province.  In that 
time, governments have wrestled with the goal of providing prosperity and an improved quality of 
life to residents while simultaneously acknowledging the challenges that continue to place the 
province at the bottom of the economic pyramid.  How can a province so rich in natural resources 
have the highest unemployment, poverty and illiteracy rates in the country?  Why do we pay so little 
attention to the challenges of human resources and finding the kind of policy instruments capable of 
promoting and sustaining viable regions. Sorting out these complex questions involves tracing out 
the interplay of politics, economics and social forces, but from an “inside” rather then externally 
constructed universal framework.   
 
It has been commonplace to assume that restructuring and change, whether regional or otherwise, 
occurs the same way everywhere.  It is part of a convenient myth connected with universal 
frameworks that reflect urban ideas, institutions and ideas.  These make it possible to ignore other 
realities and constraints, or impose new so-called “inevitable changes.”  In larger societies, there are 
other powerful forces that cushion the impact of new explanatory frameworks and make it possible 
to either oppose or soften negative outcomes.  Civil society organizations have been built and 
supported to make sure that social diversity is not ignored in any effort to bring about fundamental 
change. These societies have the capacity required to control both the pace and direction of reform.   
 
The imposition of any new framework or vision, whether in the form of regional policy silos or 
modernization,   cannot be considered much of an advantage if there are few opportunities to renew 
governance in a way that is integrating and interactive.  In the past, Joey Smallwood lacked both 
market and policy capacity.  In response, he relied upon external experts, designs, and sources rather 
than finding ways to improve local capacity and social learning.  All of this was legitimized by 
modernization theory and the power of the provincial state.  Despite these lessons of the past, we 
keep repeating the same mistakes.  There has been growing interest in the use of regional policy 
instruments, but little in the way of building regional capacity, more integration, and patterns of 
social learning.  Regional integration has occurred in different policy silos, and they have tended to 
be products of the provincial state.  These experiments have remained popular but they have worked 
against the capacity to learn together, and build shared frameworks and policy traditions.  On the 
other hand, increasing the power of regions, their ideas, interests and institutions would pose a 
potential threat to the provincial centre.  It may even be the case that some regions are unsustainable, 
or might require central participation, whether in the form of equalization or asymmetrical regions.   
It may also come to pass that different regions will move in very different directions.  Whether these 
kinds of decisions should be reached at the centre, by experts, or the community-regional level is an 
open question. 
 
From our perspective, the main problem with regionalization in the province is governance and the 
lack of opportunity to rethink, analyze, and constructively debate a popular policy instrument.  We 
attempt to map out the realities we have built and to explore various options.  The approach is 
comparative (across policy fields) and our intent is to break new ground to help foster a regional 
discourse and network.    In the province of Quebec, prior to the Quiet Revolution, there was much 
fear that new modernization frameworks and models threatened their culture and sustainability.   The 
Quiet Revolution was about developing and building capacity, both within the state and civil-society, 
learning from “best practices” but in a way that recognized and took advantage of historical 
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traditions and different circumstances.  Quebec is also well known for building more integrated 
policy networks at the local level.  Seen this way, it is time for Newfoundland and Labrador to gain 
control over their own ideas, interests, and institutions.  It could begin by rethinking regional 
integration and the tendency to construct and sustain top-down policy silos rather then finding ways 
to build more collaborative, interactive, and independent regions.   
 
Newfoundland and Labrador is unique, it has different market traditions (trucking system), it has a 
commission government, its educational and health services were provided by the Church.  These 
inherited cultural and institutional traditions matter and must be considered in any new experiments.  
Germany in the 1920’s collapsed because the country was ill-equipped for the new imposed regime.  
In the 1940’s, the discussions over the Basic Law helped prepare a German vision that was 
integrated and workable.  It accepted modernization but reflected German experiences.  Eastern 
Europe never had these kinds of opportunities, nor has Iraq.  The results have been disaster.  We 
seen much opportunity on the regional front and much opportunity to learn about what others have 
done.  But regional integration decisions and outcomes must no longer be the product of insular 
politics.  It is time to open up the process and build a network. 
 
What has become interesting, at least to academics and policy makers, is how the province can best 
respond to changes in the various forces that shape decision-making for policy.  Since the 1980s, the 
old Keynesian model of economic growth has been dethroned in favour of neo-liberal approaches to 
development, the embrace of globalization, the championing of market forces and the deployment of 
new public management practices in public service provision.  In Newfoundland and Labrador, 
governments have reacted in varying ways to these new forces and challenges.   
 
One of the most important responses has been the endorsement of regionalization in several policy 
fields for service delivery and decision-making.  Beginning in the 1990s, provincial governments 
have adopted or supported the creation of regional boards and authorities in policy fields including 
health care delivery, rural economic development, education and municipal government.  
Regionalization was adopted by government as a strategy for coping with the challenges posed by 
globalization, the emergence of a knowledge-based economy, the hegemony of the marketplace and 
as a means of providing basic services in a more efficient and less expensive manner.   
 
The purpose of the paper is to outline and evaluate how governments in Newfoundland and Labrador 
have managed political, social and economic change through the use of regionalization in four policy 
fields:  economic development; education; health care and municipal government.  Part one will 
discuss what regionalization is and why it is such a contested concept within political science.  Part 
two will examine why regionalization was embraced in Newfoundland and Labrador.  Part three will 
provide an overview of regionalization in the four policy areas under examination highlighting 
important legislative changes, Royal Commissions and other factors contributing to the 
establishment of new institutions.  Part four will examine the similarities and differences in the 
regionalization experiences across the province.  Part five will explore the policy lessons gleaned 
from regionalization through interviews with policy and decision-makers from the four policy fields.  
We argue that regionalization in Newfoundland and Labrador has been province centred, embraced 
because of political, economic and social crises and is a method by which government can use to 
reduce costs and avoid blame.  As a result, other objectives associated with regionalization such as 
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increasing community capacity, or strengthening civic engagement never received the same kind of 
attention or resources.  In our view, embracing a universal concept to defend the problems of key 
decision-makers makes sense from the historical-institutional perspective, but it might work against 
the longer term objectives of the province and regions.  However, the choice of operating in separate 
silos undermined any chance for bringing together different interests in a way that might produce a 
common vision, or shared mental map.  This has much in common with the Federal Liberals who 
manage to stay in power when the opposition was divided. In such a world, citizens are more 
spectators than participants, and there are missed opportunities to come together in a meaningful way 
to construct knowledge, identify key values and strengths.  
 
 
 
PART ONE:  REGIONALIZATION AS A CONTESTED CONCEPT 
 
As a concept, regionalization is not easy to define.  The idea of regionalization is highly contested 
and shared meanings and understandings are difficult to achieve.   
The key theoretical divisions revolve around (1) the role of the state and (2) whether domestic 
considerations affect socio-economic conditions more than international factors (i.e., globalization).  
Regionalization tends to be connected with the notion that old ideas, institutions and processes are 
out of touch and must be replaced, either incrementally over time or quickly through a regime 
change. 
 
The terms regionalization and decentralization are often used in the literature to describe the panoply 
of reforms occurring within Canadian provinces. However, these terms do not mean the same thing.  
Decentralization is the dispersion of power and authority in public planning, management and 
decision-making from higher to lower levels of government. Decentralization can occur in the 
following manner:  (1) deconcentration (administrative authority); (2) devolution (political 
authority); (3) delegation (managerial authority) and (4) privatization (service and program 
delivery). Regionalization is related to decentralization in that the former involves the adaptation of a 
provincial government’s plans or policies for a geographically defined region. In Canada, 
regionalization involves elements of decentralization; for example, the creation of regional health 
authorities (RHAs)  involves both devolution and deconcentration from the provincial to the regional 
level (Lomas, et.al., 1997). 
 
Ideas about regional governance and public management have become popular as a result of 
globalization, declining deference and other factors. Those groups who support regionalization 
maintain that regional governance structures offer a vehicle for a more efficient and effective 
definition, provision and delivery of services.  Disputes over shared meanings and understandings 
about regionalization are such that there is much at stake, and predictably, much disagreement over 
the kind of vision, processes and institutional structures required to pull together and take advantage 
of new challenges and opportunities. Debates surrounding regionalization have occurred repeatedly 
at different times and places. These can help to generate new critical insights on the barriers and 
facilitators of regional reforms.  Understandably, regionalization is connected with a growing 
skepticism about the ability of the established traditions, processes and institutions to control costs, 
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to respond to the development needs of local populations, and to be more accountable, cooperative 
and innovative.  
 
The discourses about regionalization are comparable to conceptual debates over democracy, justice, 
or federalism which have created much confusion but reflect competing agendas and the realities of 
pluralism and social diversity within society.  In these kinds of debates, the framing and advocacy of 
values reflect clear preferences and assumptions about political authority and power but may be 
presented by champions as empirical facts. As with most popular notions, the regional idea reflects 
the assumptions, power, culture, or institutional strengths of those competing for influence and the 
success or failure of new reforms will be influenced by the strength and autonomy of old pathways 
(Tomblin, 2003). Since they are outsiders pressuring for structural change, proponents of 
regionalism must find ways to contest old systems of knowledge creation and other institutional and 
cultural constraints.  Success or failure of any movement depends on issues of autonomy or the 
capacity for political mobilization. There are different theories on when and how political-policy 
change occurs. 
 
When studying  regional forms of pluralism and governance, it is important  to recognize that much 
of the debate over regionalization has been more normative than empirical. Much of the conflict 
associated with the regional concept and attention paid to normative issues is a reflection of ongoing 
academic and political disagreements. While this has created much confusion and disagreement 
among academics, policy actors and the general public, these contests are significant because they 
create new insights on the interplay and causal connections among formal structures of regimes, 
society, and the intellectual structures of ideas and ideologies that either justify or contest established 
practices.  There is much that still needs to be learned about regional innovation, change, or lack 
thereof, and the role that ideas, processes and governance structures have played in determining 
outcomes in different places and times. Unless or until we better understand the political uses of 
regionalization and the extent to which patterns of state-society relations and governance preclude 
certain kinds of reforms, it will be difficult to forecast future trends. 
 
Transformation is the product of conflict and struggle to sustain old systems or promote alternative 
frameworks during periods of stress. An enormous challenge associated with regionalization is the 
desire to either reform or replace embedded ideas, processes, interests and institutions. By nature, 
restructuring is never a smooth process and involves contesting established ideas, processes and 
institutions.  Three main theoretical frameworks have been deployed by scholars evaluating the flow 
of reform within policy fields:   institutional approaches; ideational approaches, and interest-based 
approaches.  These approaches have been used by numerous scholars reviewing policy-decisions 
across different fields.  The political science literature offers competing intellectual constructs that  
posit different ways for reconstructing and thinking about reform processes, patterns of contestation 
and assessing outcomes (Tomblin and Braun-Jackson, 2005). These theories in state-society relations 
will be relied upon to capture and highlight the various change factors that either enhance or 
constrain possibilities for policy reform and innovation.  
 
Institutional approaches are characterized by the primary organizations and entities that constitute 
the state.  These include political institutions such as Parliament, the Supreme Court, the Prime 
Minister’s Office, a provincial Premier’s office, provincial courts, legislatures and the like.  
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Institutions also include non-political entities such as schools, universities, churches, Crown 
corporations, and medical facilities whether organized individually or under the authority of a 
regional structure.  These studies typically focus on the relationships between institutions and the 
behaviour of state and societal actors.  Institutions can affect the choice of policy but do not 
determine the selection of particular goals.  Institutions can also influence the interests of policy 
actors and the resources deployed to achieve policy goals. In fact, questions of state versus society 
autonomy are critical in many policy debates.  
 
Historical-institutionalists and state-centred theorists have assumed that institutions matter (Bradford 
1998: chapter 1). As such, theorists assume that state capacity and autonomy matters most when 
analyzing policy change and political creativity, not social forces or changes in the political economy 
(such as modernization or globalization).  Institutionalists assume that whether ideas and interests 
mobilize and are capable of pushing new problems (regional or otherwise) and solutions onto the 
radar screen will depend on the institutional incentives, knowledge capacity and opportunities 
available for mobilizing support.  Path dependency, which is one form of neo-institutionalism, 
questions whether we can or should think in terms of the old state-centred versus society centred 
frameworks, especially given the historical realities of state-society interdependence. (Pierson 2000).  
Instead, it is argued that unless there is a complete regime change and another route to follow, old 
embedded partnerships, expectations, adjacent state-societal structures and processes will create 
problems for reformers.  Operating in separate regional silos, unless there a some kind of crisis or 
pressure for change, there will be little opportunity for merging different embedded values, interests, 
cells, or institutions into a common discourse or vision. 
 
A second framework to understand reform of public policy places ideas at the centre of analysis.  
Ideas are a significant part of policy decision-making because they include shared values and 
conceptions about how society works, the appropriate roles of government, key economic beliefs and 
retrospective evaluations of past decisions.  Ideas are critical with respect to agenda setting and 
problem definition. 
 
Ideas consist of values and knowledge.  Values refer to the normative beliefs and assumptions about 
how things ought to be; for example, the five components of the Canada Health Act (1984).  
Knowledge is defined as the cognitive models that help to organize how things are in reality and that 
may be quite different across policy fields, for example, health debates deal more with “population 
needs” while experts and decision-makers dealing with economic development challenges tend to 
focus more on “efficiency” or market objectives.  This is the empirical component.  The cognitive 
models and maps that we use to negotiate policy decision-making represent causal links between 
efficiency goals and equity outcomes, whether in the area of region-building, nation-building, or 
globalization.  They also help to define problems, make sense of reality, and provide alternative 
visions that compete for power and political support.  
 
During periods of crisis when old ideas, established interests and institutions appear incapable of 
dealing with new challenges and forces, there are new incentives and opportunities to push new 
agendas and either reform or replace the status quo.  Whether this occurs or not will depend on the 
availability of a new vision, and the capacity of competing interests to contest and replace the old 
regime.  On the other hand, incremental reforms can be borrowed and used to sustain the old regime.  
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Change or lack of change will depend on the level of crisis, the strength and autonomy of the old 
regime, as well as the extent to which critics can mobilize new ideas and coalition support. The 
extent to which different regions are given more capacity, independence, or power, will depend on 
the level of crisis and ability of the old regime to defend itself. Predictably, this produces quite 
different patterns of regional restructuring across dissimilar jurisdictions and policy fields.   
 
The third policy framework is interest-based approaches.  Here the emphasis shifts to the groups 
involved in giving definition to various policy decisions.  The dominant approach is pluralism and it 
is assumed that pressures for reform or change are the products of societal competition, not state 
autonomy or capacity.  Advocates of pluralism argue that competition among groups with respect to 
policy decisions and goals is the key determinant for the development of policy.  However, pluralism 
does not envision all groups being equal with respect to mobilizing resources, information and 
members.  In health care policy, some groups are privileged with respect to policy-making 
(physicians) while others are often forced to the margins of policy discourse (advocates for the 
mentally ill).  A variation on the pluralism model is that of policy communities and policy networks.  
Policy communities include all persons who have either a direct or indirect interest in the policy field 
and who share a similar policy focus (Pross,1993).  A policy community includes state actors, 
organized interest groups (the Newfoundland and Labrador Medical Association), academics, the 
mass media and the general public.  A policy network is a subset of a policy community and is 
defined by relationships among a group of actors that comes together around an issue of importance 
for the community. 
 
The post-pluralism approach followed and sought to reform patterns of state-society relations in a 
way that would strengthen civic engagement and pluralist ideals (Pross,1993). The post-pluralism 
approach offers a more optimistic approach to change.  Much of the post-pluralism literature has 
dealt with better understanding the role that policy communities (state actors and organized societal 
interests)and networks might play in building more transparent, innovative, and democratic systems 
(Tomblin, 2003).  The neo-Marxist perspective examines restructuring and outcomes based on the 
assumption that ideas, processes, and institutions reflect class biases and patterns of economic power 
(Bradford, 1998). It is an approach that assumes that agenda setting and policy choice is determined 
by economic considerations and class structure. 
 
Regionalization has appeared in very different kinds of critiques over time.  In the past, region-
alization was normally associated with modernization theories and the need to end more decen-
tralized approaches were becoming obsolete. More recently, regionalization has emerged as a 
response to the challenges of globalization and the need to reduce the role of central planning. The 
ways different societies have responded, however, has not been consistent. This suggests that 
embedded institutional processes, sources of power, systems of knowledge creation and societal 
traditions still matter and need to be further investigated (Tuohy,1999; Lewis,1997). 
 
Regionalization in the form of regional development authorities at the community level have also 
proven popular in a number of provinces since the 1990s, including Nova Scotia, Québec, Sas-
katchewan, British Columbia, and Newfoundland and Labrador.  Devolution, and the notion of 
“subsidiarity ” or integrating local economic priorities with governance structures has become a 
salient issue. There have also been efforts to create new linkages across systems. In Québec, at the 
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sub-provincial level, there have been attempts to devolve power and strengthen the community 
sector and community forms of governance across health and social policy fields (Valliancourt and 
Tremblay, 2002).  In Newfoundland and Labrador, the idea of social strategic planning has attracted 
much attention in the past. With the changing roles of markets and the state in the 21st century, there 
is much interest in exploring privatization and new state-private sector partnerships in provinces like 
Alberta, while strengthening the role of the third sector and constructing solidarity-based models in 
have-not provinces like Newfoundland and Labrador or Québec, where citizens seem to prefer the 
values of a social economy. 
 
 
 
PART TWO:  WHY DID NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR EMBRACE REGION-
ALIZATION? 
 
Regionalization, as a policy option, has been on the government’s agenda for decades.  However, it 
was during the 1990s when the provincial government began to embrace regionalization as a means 
to address several systemic problems in various policy fields.  These systemic problems included:  
delivering services to isolated and geographically dispersed populations; maintaining existing 
institutions up to standard; the lack of fiscal capacity; the closure of the northern cod fishery in 1992; 
changes to fiscal federalism, in particular the introduction of the Canada Health and Social Transfer 
(CHST) in 1994; out migration and depopulation of rural communities; limited infrastructure in 
terms of transportation and communications and below national standards of formal education.  
Government perceived regionalization to be a method for maintaining the delivery of basic services 
while permitting greater citizen participation in the policy process.  Government viewed 
regionalization as a means for off-loading unpopular policy decisions (for example program 
reductions and eliminations) onto regional boards or bodies that would then be accountable to 
citizens.  As we will show, government never formally gave these regional bodies the necessary 
power or capacity to carry out their responsibilities.  The result has been cynicism and a lack of 
support for regionalization among residents of the province. 
 
During the 1990s, the significant reasons for the adoption of regionalization in Newfoundland and 
Labrador included: 
 
 
• reducing costs; 
• responding better to the needs of local populations; 
• increasing local control over decision-making; 
• coordinating and integrating services; 
• achieving efficiencies in resource allocation; 
• improving access to services; 
• effective management of institutions; 
• more accountability, and 
• achieving improved outcomes. 
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In the policy fields under investigation (health care reform, rural economic development, education 
and municipal restructuring), regionalization was tried and implemented with different degrees of 
success.  As Figure 1 shows, we can place the various regionalization attempts along a continuum 
from those that least successful to those most successful. 
 
Figure 1:  The Regionalization Continuum 
 
                                                              Education                              Health 
Lowest level of regionalization→●→→●→→→→→→●→→→→→→●Highest level  
    Municipal                        Economic Development 
 
Since 1990, regionalization has occurred on a very limited scale with respect to municipal gov-
ernment service delivery and governance.  Regionalization has not proved popular with either voters 
or municipal politicians across the province and the idea has met with much resistance (Boswell, 
et.al., 1997).  Regionalization has also occurred within education at the elementary and secondary 
levels.  Here the main debates have focused on the reduction in the number of school districts and 
the ability to deliver services in a fair and equitable manner for both rural and urban populations.  In 
many respects, debates about regionalization within the policy field of education have been 
overshadowed by the denominational control over schools that was the norm until 1998.  With 
respect to economic development and health care, regionalization has endured and can be considered 
successful.  The original 17 regional economic development zones (now 20 in number) were 
conceived by Clyde Wells in 1992 and became reality in 1995.  The regionalization of health care 
began in 1992 and the first health authorities came into being in 1994-95.  Regional integrated health 
authorities exercise a significant role in policy formation with respect to health care in the province 
as they are responsible for hiring physicians, maintaining hospitals and other medical institutions, 
delivering services to patients and other health human resource issues.  The regional economic 
development boards do not have the same degree of influence with respect to policy-making as they 
are poorly funded, understaffed and in some cases lacking the capacity to lobby government for 
change.  For this reason, we argue that regionalization has been more successful with respect to 
health care reform and restructuring than it has for rural economic development. 
 
An irony in the process of regionalization is that centralization can and does often occur. One of the 
significant consequences is that the number of opportunities for citizen participation have actually 
been curtailed through the centralization of various services delivered by boards or authorities such 
as school boards, regional economic development boards (REDBs) and regional integrated health 
authorities (RIHAs).  The devolution of powers by provincial governments has the potential to allow 
lay persons opportunities to participate in decision-making and tailor decisions to the specific needs 
of local communities.  However, the idea of citizen participation enhancing democracy under 
regionalization is problematic for three reasons:  
 
(1) various programs and the financing of these are extremely complex and require specialized 
knowledge that most citizens do not possess;  
(2) for participation to be effective, new voices need to be heard. This has the potential to broaden 
conflict and make it difficult to achieve agreement, and  
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(3) the desire to provide greater democracy for decision-making has been regarded by some 
scholars and members of policy communities as a cynical ploy to avoid blame for reductions in 
spending and services (Frankish, et.al., 2002). 
 
Several problems plague citizen participation with respect to regionalization. First, resources tar-
geted toward improving community mobilization can lead to power struggles among different 
persons and groups. Jonathan Lomas refers to this phenomenon as “negotiated compromise” 
between government expectations, members of the policy community’s interests and citizens’ needs 
and interests (Lomas, 1997). Second, participation is interpreted very differently among groups. 
More research is needed to clarify the rationale and scope of citizen participation in fields such as 
health delivery and promotion and economic development. Citizen participation also encompasses 
responsibility, accountability and liability for decisions made. Few citizens can dedicate the time and 
resources needed to act in this capacity on a regional board or authority. Another concern is that 
governments can create conditions that may affect citizen participation in health, education, 
municipal and economic reform. Such government policies include setting goals; providing 
infrastructure for regional bodies (budgets, knowledge development, training); strengthening 
community control and community support sectors and promoting perspectives on policy. This is 
important because an active population tends to create more responsive public and governmental 
agencies that can address the needs of citizens more effectively. This strategy is useful in creating 
social capital to make for healthier communities (Frankish, et.al., 2002). 
 
With respect to regionalization, there continue to be strong and serious threats to citizen partici-
pation.  Some key questions for future study include: 
 
• what are the benefits of citizen participation in terms of processes, affects on individuals and 
outcomes in terms of improved policy decisions? 
• what strategies have been implemented to support citizen participation with respect to 
training and knowledge? 
• how can tensions be resolved between members of the policy community and lay citizens 
with respect to knowledge of the policy system and the legitimacy of decisions taken? 
 
So far, there is little evidence from the regionalization experiments in Newfoundland and Labrador 
that these questions have been adequately addressed.  The reality is that there is a fundamental 
tension between a bottom-up and community driven process for policy decision-making and a 
centralized, top-down and professionally driven approach. 
 
A related dimension concerns the selection of individuals to regional boards and authorities.  Two 
methods are used:  election to boards and appointment by the provincial government.  Across the 
country, appointed bodies are much more common than elected ones.  Why?  First, appointment 
allows the provincial government to exercise control over the process of regionalization.  Second, 
appointment favours persons with commitments to improving services for the entire region rather 
than their own community, and third, appointment  allows government to reward friends and loyal 
supporters.   The main disadvantage with appointed boards is the lack of legitimacy and 
accountability to citizens’ interests (Lewis, et.al., 2001).  Even in policy fields where elections do 
occur (i.e., school boards in Newfoundland and Labrador, regional health authorities in 
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Saskatchewan), turnout and interest are low (Lewis, et.al., 2001).  With respect to citizen par-
ticipation and democracy, Lomas notes that provincial governments do not see citizen control over 
health and other policy outcomes as an end in itself. Citizen governors may be perceived as agents of 
rationalization, integration and coordination or allies to reduce expenses, allocate scarce resources or 
act as a counterweight to powerful entrenched interests. Most provincial governments are ambivalent 
about fostering citizen participation because citizens often rise up to protest the expectations and 
goals set by government. Health providers have been vociferous in their criticism of citizen 
governance because they have been forced to cede jurisdiction over issues they previously 
controlled. Lomas concludes that devolution and regionalization have been used by governments to 
avoid making tough choices about spending and health delivery (March 15, 1997). 
 
One of the oft cited concerns with regionalization is the degree to which regions can transcend or 
replace citizens’ identification to their communities. That is, to what extent are citizens expected to 
respond to newly created entities located between their local communities and their province of 
residence? Can a regional board produce the kind of support of identity among individuals akin to 
pride in one’s hometown? Lewis (1997) makes two observations.  First, elections for board 
membership (Saskatchewan) relied on a ward rather than an at-large electoral system. Ward systems 
encourage representatives to be parochial in their behaviour because they will look out for their own 
constituents rather than seeking the best policy for the entire region. Second, new definitions of 
community have emerged in the literature as a result of changes wrought by globalization and 
technological change. However, old practices and models, like dandelion weeds, have deep roots 
(Lewis, 1997). Community rivalries are a fact of life in Canada and such behaviour impairs the 
success of a regional board for improving policy outcomes for the population. Lewis argues that 
there must be incentives in place to foster the conditions necessary for a regional consciousness. 
 
With respect to regionalization and downsizing, Lewis notes that success is based on whether 
regionalization is seen as being legitimate. There are three ways to evaluate this legitimacy: 
• are the provincial government’s motivations credible? 
• are the regional entities properly structured and given sufficient authority and 
• does the environment (government policies) surrounding the genesis of regionalization 
assist or impede successful implementation (Lewis, 1997)? 
 
What about the examples from Newfoundland and Labrador?  With respect to the first dimension, 
we argue that government’s motivations are somewhat credible.  Discussions about regionalization 
have been around in Newfoundland since the Commission of Government period (1933-1949) with 
respect to health care and education.  More recently, government has expressed the desire to deliver 
services in a more efficient manner and has touted the benefits of citizen participation in policy 
decision-making.  However, the desire to regionalize service delivery should not be interpreted as a 
sign that government is in the mood to devolve its authority to other institutions.  Regional 
integrated health authorities, for example, are not given sufficient autonomy with respect to 
budgeting, health human resources issues and equity versus need with respect to patient services.  
The REDBs have chronically been under funded and understaffed by government since their creation 
in the mid-1990s. 
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In terms of the second dimension, regionalization is more problematic.  Government has dictated 
the boundaries for regional authorities in education, economic development and health care often 
without citizen input.  Regional communities cannot define themselves or the values, and objectives 
connected with their particular regional vision. The recent reductions in the number of school boards 
and health authorities by the Williams government occurred without any consultation from citizens 
and members of the various policy communities.  In Newfoundland and Labrador, regionalization is 
very much a top-down, province centred approach to service delivery.  Debates and discussions 
about the legitimacy of regional boards revolve around such factors as the quality and motivations of 
RHA appointees; the assumption of hidden agendas in the regionalization process; a suspicion that 
provincial governments are devolving problems rather than authority to local communities and the 
layers of bureaucratic management that exist at the expense of the public good (Lewis, 1997). 
 
In terms of the third dimension, there are two types of environments in which regionalization occurs:  
the provincial government embraces regionalization in order to downsize and restructure in a policy 
field and  a provincial government initiates a major restructuring of its policy by reducing spending 
and resource allocation and then announces a policy of regionalization with the assumption that the 
system will be able to maintain itself without sufficient funds.  It has been the second type of 
environment that is more common in Newfoundland and Labrador.  For example, the Wells 
government announced hospital bed reductions and closures in the early 1990s followed up quickly 
by an announcement that health care would be delivered through regional authorities. 
 
Before moving on to a description regionalization and reform in our four policy fields, it is important 
to note that regionalization has not been a coherent or organic process in Newfoundland and 
Labrador.  In other words, regionalization in one policy field did not necessarily spur change in other 
policy fields.  Interested groups and individuals have often been excluded from participating in the 
debates and discussions about the complexion of regionalization.  We argue this is problematic 
because regionalization requires new perspectives and voices in order to challenge the hegemonic 
position of old ideas and established procedures and methods for making policy decisions. 
 
 
PART THREE:  REGIONALIZATION AND REFORM IN FOUR POLICY FIELDS 
 
Each of our policy fields has been the site of various reforms including the establishment of new 
institutions to regionalize service delivery.  Some fields, such as health care and economic 
development, have more formally structured governance structures than municipal government or 
education.  Education services are usually delivered through school boards but as will be 
demonstrated, the school boards have been regionalized across the province in the recent past.  This 
section of the paper will offer an overview of regionalization and reform for each policy field 
highlighting important legislative changes, governance structures and drivers for reform. 
 
Patterns of policy framing and discourse in Newfoundland and Labrador have been influenced by the 
lack of resources necessary for experimentation and rural-urban divisions that have made it difficult 
to create common province-centred perceptions, new patterns of integration and interaction with 
shared agendas.  Such a context has also complicated the task of building the kinds of coalitions 
required or necessary to contest the legitimacy of the old embedded regime. The power and 
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autonomy of established interests that underpin health governance should not be underestimated 
nor should their ability to adjust and survive in a complex policy world.   
 
Whether an alternative approach to reform (alternative policy frame) is successful or not depends 
very much on the policy ideas that define the new reality, the institutions that are relied upon to 
debate issues, the interests connected with these, communication opportunities, resources and 
political incentives to move in a new directions.  There are different perspectives on the explanatory 
powers of ideas, institutions, and interests and we will explore the dynamic interplay among these 
elements to generate new critical insights on which factors need to be in place to facilitate health 
care reforms.   
 
Contextual factors such as demographic shifts, urban-rural divisions, technological change, 
modernization and globalization all create common pressures for political institutional and policy 
change.  Yet, despite the views of modernization, globalization and other universal theories, societies 
do not always respond the same way to common circumstances or changing realities.  Rather, other 
theories suggest that whether policy-political changes occur or not will depend on the political actors 
and social forces that play a role in either promoting or constraining the impact of contextual factors 
and associated reform visions competing for power.  Within a complex federal system with a strong 
level of respect for diversity and multi-level governance, it is really not surprising that common 
problems and underlying contextual factors might create problems for universal, pan-Canadian 
solutions.  In reality, such big changes have been difficult to manoeuvre through formal and informal 
provincial systems of power-sharing and networking that must be co-opted or replaced in any push 
for policy reform.  We are interested in learning more through our case-studies about the challenges 
associated with quick policy responses, the strengths and weaknesses of a fragmented policy-
political system, the arguments for incrementalism, and the like. 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador did not join Canada until 1949.  The province has a strong sense of 
identity, and has tended to be wary of attempts to define problems and impose solutions based on the 
universal experiences and visions created elsewhere.   In 1949, Joey Smallwood embraced the idea 
of modernization and went out of his way to create a new regime.  But such a top-down, leader-
centred, universal approach created much suspicion, and made it difficult to develop the kind of 
common perceptions and shared agendas required to integrate different interests and values. In the 
1970s, Newfoundland nationalism emerged and there has ever since been much resistance about 
embracing outside visions that do not take into account local circumstances.  Consequently, there has 
been some hostility to simply accepting outside perceptions and reform agendas.   
 
Historically speaking, Newfoundland and Labrador has not always benefited from the frames or 
mental maps that have been designed to help actors identify and define problems and construct 
solutions.  Prior to Confederation, the practice of accepting competing visions and prescriptions 
never seemed to work in dealing with changing circumstances (Government of Newfoundland, 1986; 
Hillier and Neary, 1980). 
  
For example, the decisions to build a railway, promote agriculture, and the like, have worked against 
new calls for universal solutions, and those seeking coalition support of new initiatives, new forms 
of management, data collection, and knowledge creation.  Many of these experiments in the past 
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failed to produce results and this, along with powerful embedded idealized myths about the place 
as a vibrant, self-reliant society, has worked against external calls for reform.  Nor has there been the 
kind of resources available for contesting the power of these expectations, regimes and policies from 
within. 
 
On the other hand, Newfoundland and Labrador has had a long history of informal innovation.  It has 
a small population which makes it easier to work informally in communicating information, creating 
shared frameworks, and producing mental maps. In the past, there was much reliance placed on the 
church, doctors, social movements, and other social forces in prescribing and developing innovative 
initiatives required for addressing new challenges and changing circumstances.    In sum, 
Newfoundland and Labrador is a place that has relied on informal, local structures to define issues 
and problems and find solutions. Put simply, in an era of both globalization and increased pressure 
for smaller, local forms of governance, these contradictory and conflicting historical trends have 
contributed to the problems of agenda-setting and sense of crisis and stagnation. 
 
 
Table One:  Selected Economic, Social, Demographic And Health Measures For Newfound-
land And Labrador1 
 
Variable Measure 
Population  515,946 (April, 2005) 
Gross Domestic Product $19.563 billion (2004) 
Per Capita Income $24, 677 (2004) 
Unemployment Rate (unadjusted) 12.5% (June, 2005) 
Employment Rate 73.6% (2000) 
Average Couple Family Income2 $56,500 (2001) 
Unemployment Insurance Incidence3 36.2% (2001) 
Economic Self-Reliance Ratio4 77.5% (2001) 
Home Ownership  78% (2001) 
Average Value of Dwellings $76, 285 (2001) 
Life Expectancy 77 years (2001) 
Rate of Population Obesity5 39% (2001) 
Rate of Smoking for Population 12 years+ 25% (2001) 
Self-Assessed Health Status6 79% (1995) 
Population receiving Social Assistance 13.8% (2001) 
                                                 
1 .  Sources:  Newfoundland and Labrador Community Accounts; Newfoundland and Labrador Statistics Agency. 
2 .  Measured as the total income of all the couple families divided by the number of such families.  The measure 
excludes non-family persons and lone-parent families. 
3 .  Measured as the number of people receiving Employment Insurance during the year divided by the number of 
people in the labour force.  The labour force here is defined as the number of people in receipt of Employment 
Insurance or employment income within the year. 
4 .  Defined as the ratio of market income from all sources to total personal income.  The ratio of 77.5% means that 
of all income flowing into the province, 77.5 % came from market sources and 22.5% came from government 
transfers. 
5 .  Based on the population 15 years and older with a BMI greater than 27. 
6 .  Measures the personal assessment of one’s health. 
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High School Diploma or higher7 60.4% (2001) 
University Degree (Age 25-54) 12.8% (2001) 
 
Table One contains several measures with respect to Newfoundland and Labrador’s demographic, 
economic, health and social position.  Several of these measures are crucial with respect to the 
province’s ability to initiate meaningful reform in terms of health care.  First, the province’s 
population has been declining over the last decade.  In particular, the provincial population declined 
by seven percent between 1996 and 2001.  Out-migration has been a feature of Newfoundland and 
Labrador for decades but the problem was exacerbated during the 1990s as a result of the cod 
moratorium in 1992 and the severe reductions in provincial spending in order to slay the deficit 
dragon.  A majority of those leaving the province tend to be young, educated and women of child 
bearing age.  Not only is the population declining, it is rapidly aging too.  Newfoundland and 
Labrador’s median age of its population is among the highest in the country.   
 
While the province has begun to experience remarkable economic growth as a result of revenues 
flowing from off-shore oil developments and resource extraction (nickel at Voisey Bay in Labrador), 
the benefits are largely confined to the metropolitan St. John’s area and the Avalon peninsula.  Rural 
or “outport” Newfoundland has suffered a tremendous economic decline due to the loss of the in-
shore fishery, cuts in federal unemployment insurance and out-migration coupled with a lack of 
educational opportunities.  In rural areas, providing basic health services has always been 
challenging and the province is typically preoccupied with issues such as the retention and 
recruitment of physicians, the provision of primary care services, health human resource concerns 
and the location of hospitals and other medical facilities.  In rural Newfoundland, health and 
education are major economic engines.  Table 2 shows the percentage of people employed in both 
health care and education for each of the province’s economic zones.   
 
TABLE 2:  HEALTH AND EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT AS A PECENTAGE OF ALL 
OCCUPATIONS BY ECONOMIC ZONE8 
 
Economic Zone % Employed in Health % Employed in Education 
1 2.5 8.2 
2 2.4 3.1 
3 4.0 3.7 
4 1.5 4.0 
5 3.2 2.7 
6 5.9 3.6 
7 2.7 2.9 
8 6.8 4.9 
9 4.4 5.3 
10 2.9 5.5 
11 2.7 6.2 
12 7.3 4.1 
                                                 
7 .  Population aged 20 years or older who have completed grade 12. 
8 .  Source:  Newfoundland and Labrador Community Accounts. 
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13 2.0 4.4 
14 4.5 3.7 
15 3.2 4.2 
16 3.6 4.4 
17 5.3 3.9 
18 4.7 3.3 
19 7.5 5.1 
20 3.6 4.4 
 
It matters economically, since both health and education are large employers that pay good wages in 
areas where rates of unemployment and social assistance incidence are high.  Having access to 
health and education matters for other industries hoping to recruit and maintain human resources.  
All of this makes it difficult to politically contest one of the last remaining economic pillars in rural 
Newfoundland.  Given the high political stakes involved, it has been very difficult to push new 
radical health reforms in a province with limited policy capacity, historical fears over universal-
central approaches, and rapid rural decline. 
 
Regionalization and Health Care Reform 
 
The key themes that characterize health care reform in Newfoundland and Labrador since 1990 
include the following: 
 
 Formal versus informal kinds of reform; 
 Rural versus urban interests; 
 Proactive versus reactive responses by decision-makers; 
 Role of fiscal, political and social crises; 
 Market-based solutions not an alternative; 
 Reforms not province-centred. 
 
With respect to formal versus informal kinds of reform, a good example concerns the establishment 
of the Office of Primary Health Care.  This entity is housed within the Department of Health and 
Community Services and was created by government to oversee the development and 
implementation of seven primary health care pilot projects across the province.  The funding for the 
Office and its staff comes from the federal government’s Primary Health Care Transition Fund and is 
in place until the end of March, 2006.  It is an example of a formal reform where government moved 
to create an institution to oversee the process.   
 
A good example of informal reform concerns the management of wait lists for patients requiring 
open heart and by-pass surgery.  These lists are managed collectively by a team of cardiologists in 
St. John’s who meet weekly to determine which individuals are in greatest need for the procedure.  
Neither government nor the regional health authority has anything to do with this informal 
management system (Respondent 11). 
 
Several examples highlight the differences between rural and urban areas of the province with 
respect to health care reform.  Wait lists are generally more of a problem for people in urban areas, 
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especially St. John’s, than in rural localities.  The principal reason is that all tertiary care services 
are provided in St. John’s so patients requiring specialized medical procedures living in rural 
communities will be required to travel to the capital.  Often these patients will remain hospitalized in 
St. John’s because of a lack of available beds in hospitals in their home region.  Another example 
concerns models of physician payment.  In the 1990s, government introduced legislation that paid 
physicians practicing in St. John’s and surrounding communities for only 50 percent of their MCP 
(Medical Care Plan) billings as a means of encouraging more doctors to set up practice in under 
serviced locales (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1998).  The policy was eventually 
withdrawn after much protest by the NLMA but suggests that retention and recruitment of 
physicians is more salient for rural areas of the province than urban ones.  Connected to the issue of 
physician availability is access to medical facilities.  As noted above, health care is a major driver of 
the rural economy because jobs are unionized and plentiful.  However, some doctors and other health 
professionals risk losing their skills because there are so few patients who require certain services 
(obstetrics in particular).  These specialists would have more opportunities to sharpen their skills 
working in facilities in urban areas.  At the same time, the building of specialized medical services 
could create new economic opportunities and forms of innovation for the provincial economy.  
 
Health care reform and restructuring in Newfoundland and Labrador has been driven largely by 
regionalization of service delivery and management.  In the early 1990s, Newfoundland and Lab-
rador, along with many other provinces across the country (with the exception of Ontario), identified 
regionalization as a way to cope with spiralling health care expenditures. 
 
Did regionalization emerge in response to a fiscal crisis in health care as a way for the government 
of the day to decentralize responsibility to newly created institutional bodies or were decision-
makers attracted to the concept as a vehicle for pluralizing policy making and enabling medical 
delivery more sensitive to the needs of local communities? We argue that regionalization was 
embraced by the provincial government because it did not affect the hegemonic position of 
physicians in the health system, it did not cost more than the old health system and it could be 
marketed to citizens as a method of achieving efficiencies and making patient care better. 
 
Regionalization has been around since the 1960s but took off in the 1990s due to a series of crises: 
 Fiscal crises brought about by national recession and changes to health, education and social 
program financing (the CHST) 
 Economic crises including the cod moratorium of 1992, civil service layoffs and freezing of 
department budgets by government. 
 
The Wells government established a Resource Committee to review the state of the health system in 
1990.  Members of this committee were drawn from the Newfoundland and Labrador Medical 
Association, the Newfoundland and Labrador Hospital and Nursing Home Association, the 
Association of Registered Nurses of Newfoundland, the Faculty of Medicine at Memorial University 
and the provincial Department of Health. The urge to embrace regionalization as a panacea for 
rocketing health care costs was driven primarily by fiscal concerns and not the long-term 
improvement of the system (Botting, 2000).  For example, in the 1992 provincial budget, it was 
announced that 450 acute care beds would be eliminated along with 850 jobs as a means of reducing 
hospital and health costs. 
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The province adopted several other strategies for combating rising expenditures.  These included a 
focus on the population health model, an integrated approach to health care delivery and a shift from 
hospital to community level care.  The key strategy adopted by the provincial government dealt with 
the establishment of regional health boards.  Several health care groups who were part of the 
Resource Committee endorsed the concept as a means of creating efficiencies in the health system.  
 
Health Minister Decker appointed Lucy Dobbin (a former CEO of St. Clare’s Hospital in St. John’s) 
to chair a commission to review how hospital boards could be collapsed.  In March, 1993, the Report 
on the Reduction of Hospital Boards was released.  The considerations guiding the reduction of 
hospital boards included the following: 
 how reductions would affect quality of health services; 
 opportunities for improving the coordination of acute and long term care services; 
 continued participation by publicly appointed trustees to have a voice in regional health 
boards; 
 efficiencies and best practices for using scarce fiscal and human resources and 
 the ability to take advantage of economies of scale provided by alternate models of govern-
ance (Dobbin, 1993).  
 
Government touted several benefits that would result from regionalizing medical service delivery.  
First, overall health planning for a region by a single board would be preferable to planning being 
carried out by individual hospital boards.  Second, regionalization allows for coordinated health care 
especially between acute and long-term facilities and needs.  Third, the role of trustees would be 
preserved within a regionalized health system.  
Fourth, savings can be realized when reorganization occurs that allows for services to be integrated 
and coordinated. 
 
In St. John’s, eight separate institutions merged to form the Health Care Corporation of St. John’s 
(HCCSJ).  The HCCSJ undertook an education campaign to disseminate information to the general 
public, staff and unions.  For example, integration of clinical services across sites was completed in 
1996 and a significant reduction in management positions was realized as a result of amalgamation.  
In rural Newfoundland and Labrador,  
an immediate consequence of the new boards being established was a reduction in management staff.  
One challenge for rural boards was the rationalization of clinical services given the tremendous 
geographical dispersion in some of the regions.   Some rural boards also experienced unpleasant 
political effects as a result of regionalization.  Historic and regional rivalries among communities as 
well as institutions often contributed to a climate of decision-making that was hostile rather than 
cooperative. 
 
In the first stage of regionalization, government established two types of health boards:  institutional 
and integrated.  The institutional boards were responsible for the delivery of medical services 
through hospitals and clinics in each region.  Integrated boards combined the functions of the 
institutional boards with community and social services programs provided to the population within 
the region.  Beginning in 1998, a third type of board was created.  Health and community services 
boards were created to administer health prevention, promotion, child welfare, addiction, mental 
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health and other programs within the province.  The adoption of such boards followed the make 
over of the Department of Health into a new Department of Health and Community Services.  The 
new department assumed responsibility for some functions previously under the rubric of the 
Department of Human Resources and Employment.  The new structure was meant to reflect 
government’s commitment to following through on a strategy of health prevention and promotion for 
the province. 
 
Regionalization of health care is barely a decade old in Newfoundland and Labrador.  There have 
been significant changes with respect to restructuring and closing of institutions and transfer of 
services within the system.  The boards, whether institutional or health and community services, 
have bore the brunt of these changes and have often been criticized and vilified by the public for 
apparent failures. The key individuals who brought forward regionalized health care were located 
inside government or within the hospitals and health institutions themselves.  Thus, the development 
of regionalized health care took on very much a “made in Newfoundland and Labrador” tint as it 
evolved. 
 
For many of our participants, the “losers” in terms of regionalization appeared to be rural com-
munities and their health facilities.  Regionalization itself was defined and framed by those persons 
inside the policy community:  politicians, senior civil servants, members of health professional 
groups, health institutions and best practices from other jurisdictions.  Ordinary citizens and 
community groups were not privy to the debates defining the issue.  Regionalization is the only 
major health reform that has taken off in Newfoundland and Labrador.  Much of this was due to the 
fact that the issue mattered and there were strong political efforts to contest the status quo, 
accommodate power interests and then build a new vision and policy community. The fact that 
doctors and drug companies were unaffected by these changes likely made it easier to institutionalize 
a regional system of governance thereafter.  Besides, as suggested above, with the exception of 
Ontario, regionalization became a popular strategy for dealing the health restructuring and the 
contradictory forces of decentralization as well as consolidation.  
 
Regionalization of medical service delivery occurred in Newfoundland and Labrador for two main 
reasons.  First, reform was undertaken because of a fiscal crisis caused by recession, the collapse of 
the northern cod fishery and reductions in health care transfers to the province from Ottawa.  It was 
also a period of national crisis when the federal government was not likely to do anything to help the 
province.  Besides, with the rise of the fiscal imperative, new ideas in New Zealand (and around the 
world) about the inevitability of radical restructuring, there was much incentive to adopt a new 
health vision. Viewed from the provincial government’s perspective, there was much incentive to 
restructure. At the time, the status quo was not really considered an option. Second, the institutional 
or acute care providers were separated from the community or public health providers in the 1990s 
because the government finally recognized that health care prevention and promotion is money well 
spent.  
 
The establishment of regional health boards by the provincial government was a harbinger of change 
to the health system.  There was also a clear attempt on the part of the provincial government to 
ensure the issue mattered provincially within the discourse, among key stakeholders in the policy 
field, and the general public.  Much attention was placed on finding need ways to communicate on a 
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province-centred basis through public documents, meetings with stakeholders, and so on.  All of 
this was down to build new ideas, interests, and institutions into a new policy vision carefully 
constructed to  influenced the future politics of health care or who gets what, when, where, and how 
in the province.  There were clear attempts to deal with potential obstacles to the new approach 
while ensuring powerful factions (doctors) were accommodated.  The regional approach adopted 
provided a means by which the most powerful interests in the health system were preserved and 
protected, while creating new forms of integration and interaction in other sectors.  The notion of 
regionalization was very popular on both the left and right and there were clear attempts to rely upon 
this to promote reform.  On the left, regionalization was popular since it created new opportunities to 
engage the public and deal more with social determinants.  On the right, regionalization was a way to 
improve efficiencies, and rely less upon the state to define and resolve issues (Tomblin, 2003).  
Regionalization became a very ambiguous concept, with many contradictions and tensions 
associated with it.  While this added to the challenge of implementation, it made it easier to get on to 
the radar screen since it was a vision that appealed to many interests, even if they were contradictory. 
 
Most significantly, policy makers embraced a “determinants of health” approach to explain the need 
for and access to services as well as developing programs to encourage better lifestyle choices 
among the population.  Such an approach was popular on the left , the public, and various 
stakeholder organizations. The NLHBA, in its former incarnation as the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Health Care Association, played an important role in the development of the current health 
care system in Newfoundland and Labrador.  The following list of assumptions and principles was 
used as a guide to redesigning the health system in the province: 
 
 
 consumers are active partners in health planning, delivery and evaluation; 
 a greater emphasis is placed on population health; 
 individuals must have greater autonomy over decision-making as it relates to their own 
health; 
 there should be more community health services and referrals with a multidisciplinary 
approach to provide balance within the system; 
 the Charter of Rights and Freedoms must be kept in mind in terms of resource allocation; 
 all health services and programs are accessible to the intended patient groups; 
 the concept of regionalization must undergo continuous refinement with a commitment to 
health programming based on population health status; 
 a comprehensive human resource plan must be developed; 
 health care partners (decision makers, participants, planners) are educated with respect to 
quality of life issues which becomes the fundamental theme for determining health quality; 
 evidence based decision making determines programs and services to be delivered; 
 comprehensive provincial standards such as manageable wait lists, distance travelled to 
access health services and so on must be developed, and  
 all government policies are to be analyzed for their health affects with policies geared toward 
the promotion of healthy outcomes (Newfoundland and Labrador Health Care Association, 
1997). 
Regionalization, at least in its 1994-2005 form, reflects the move from a health system focusing on 
cure for acute conditions to one where the emphasis is on prevention, promotion of lifestyle change 
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and participation from key groups. 
 
When regionalization was embraced by the Wells government in 1993, the primary reasons given 
were to provide improved continuity of health care and to avoid costly duplication.  The main driver 
behind regionalization was fiscal; that is, the government wanted to reign in health spending without 
disruption to basic service delivery.   
The Department of Health and Community Services has transferred responsibility for health care 
delivery to the boards while monopolizing policy making.  Before the boards were in place, the 
Department directly managed nearly twenty cottage hospitals.  These were replaced or closed down 
entirely with the advent of regionalization.  While the government does retain some degree of 
control over the health boards with respect to budgets and appointments, the boards are still deemed 
to be primarily responsible for providing services to patients. 
 
A recent review of regionalization with respect to acute care in Newfoundland and Labrador 
contained several important findings on the effects of reform.  The study found that 
 
 regionalization alone does not completely explain cost drivers and may not be an effective way 
to control health costs; 
 opportunities for the further integration and rationalization of services and institutions exist 
within the health system and strategic planning and leadership are crucial to control costs; 
 hospital closures within a context of regionalization and program management may not neces-
sarily lead to a deterioration in healthcare provider attitudes, patient satisfaction and quality of 
care; 
 ways of keeping healthcare workers in the system include more money, efforts to improve work 
load, overtime and productivity, reducing unnecessary demand for health services and a 
reduction of health need due better population health; 
 targeted interventions offer a more effective means to improve use and efficiency as well as 
patient satisfaction; 
 access to acute care beds is a tremendous problem (Barrett, et.al., 2003). 
 
Regionalized health care is clearly not a cure for reducing health spending in the province.  As well, 
there is not enough public education or awareness of the major changes that have occurred in the 
health system (Newfoundland and Labrador Health Boards Association, 2002). 
 
The most recent round of reforms connected to regionalization formally began in 2003 when the 
Progressive Conservative Party of Newfoundland and Labrador, led by Danny Williams, won the 
provincial election defeating incumbent Premier and Liberal Roger Grimes.  Williams laid out his 
party’s policy platform in the “Blue Book.”  Many of the proposals were targeted toward reducing 
the debt and deficit of the provincial government.  The Department of Health and Community 
Services was not exempt from the desire to reduce the size and expenditure of government.  In the 
end, with little public involvement, the government seized control of the experiment, dealt with the 
tensions associated with competing priorities and contradictions, and imposed its own vision 
(Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2004).  Such a formal approach to regionalization 
brought advantages but it also made it difficult to reflect the interests and values of the population. 
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Regionalization and Economic Development 
 
By the early 1970s, the rural development movement9 in Newfoundland and Labrador had gone 
through two distinct stages.  In stage one, rural development was cast as a reformist social movement 
that was loosely organized; dominated by the petit bourgeois class; incorporating a diverse array of 
strategies and activities aimed at rural renewal and having an antagonistic relationship to 
government.  In stage two, rural development was rigidly organized through state supported 
expansion and growth; limitations on geographical size, behaviour and kinds of activities; 
government is viewed as a partner in the process of rural renewal largely through the administration 
of make work and other job creation programs (Curran, 1992).   
 
Largely the result of chronically high unemployment in Newfoundland and Labrador (approximately 
24 percent in the mid-1980s), the Peckford government established the Royal Commission on 
Employment and Unemployment (RCEU).  One of the key features of the RCEU was that the rural 
economy was taken seriously.  The researchers recognized that the rural development movement and 
the many rural development associations (RDAs) would play a fundamental role in the process of 
developing the outport economy.  The idea was to provide the tools to the RDAs so that they could 
initiate long-term social and economic development rather than simply relying on government 
transfers to survive.  However, senior bureaucrats responsible for economic development did not 
concur with the Commission’s conclusions.  As House quotes from a post Commission government 
report, 
 
“The Study Team views the Commission’s overall vision of rural Newfoundland as idyllic 
and unrealistic.  It is seen as a romantic vision which does not recognize the profound 
changes that have occurred in rural Newfoundland over the past 50 years, including the 
continuing migration of people (especially young people) from smaller centres to larger 
centres ... the Study Team questions whether wide-scale employment opportunities are 
potentially available in all parts of the Province, but particularly in rural Newfoundland.” 
(House, 2003:232) 
 
The lack of support for and endorsement of the RCEU’s recommendations with respect to regional 
economic development forced the RDAs to carry forward on their own. 
 
A change in government occurred in 1989 when Clyde Wells and the Liberals assumed power.  One 
of the key promises made by the Liberals during the election was to establish regional economic 
boards across the province to assist in development.  Premier Wells also established the Economic 
Recovery Commission (ERC) which was Chaired by Memorial University sociologist J.D. House 
(who also chaired the RCEU).  The government also called for the development of a strategic 
economic plan to brainstorm ideas to cope with the economic situation in the province.  The result 
was the publication of Change and Challenge in June, 1992.  The thrust of these innovations was to 
focus on the “new” regional economic development where rural Newfoundland would not be 
                                                 
9 .  For our purposes, rural and regional development are used interchangeably and mean the same 
thing. 
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neglected and an emphasis on market driven practices coupled with significant institutional 
changes would be enacted to sustain communities.   
 
The key recommendation was the creation of regional economic zones across the province.  The 
zones, numbering 17 in total10, were designed to assist in the development of economic plans by 
citizens in each part of the province.  Why the creation of economic zones?  The following reasons 
were offered: 
 
• each region is better able to participate in and respond to opportunities for economic growth; 
• better coordination and integration of economic planning; 
• citizen input in developing economic plans for each zone; 
• joint projects can be undertaken by zonal communities; 
• major centres in each zone will have infrastructure improved to attract new services and invest-
ments; 
• greater regionalization of government administration and 
• the unique characteristics of each region will be easier to identify and will be better understood 
(Change and Challenge, 1992:16-18). 
 
The zones were also adopted as a means of decentralizing government decision-making to the local 
level.  Premier Clyde Wells, a staunch supporter of the zonal process, spent a long weekend drawing 
up the zone boundaries himself (House, 2003).  The establishment of economic zones anticipated the 
withdrawal of federal funds from rural economic development in the early 1990s.  With fewer 
federal dollars to fund the Newfoundland and Labrador Rural Development Council (NLRDC) and 
the 59 RDAs (1994), it became apparent that rural and regional development needed to be 
streamlined and made more accountable (House, 2003). 
 
In the early 1990s, the rural development movement was in a process of re-evaluating its functions 
and goals.  Many volunteers and staff with the RDAs were becoming frustrated and cynical about the 
prospects of their organizations acting as conduits between government and residents for make-work 
projects.  Many in the movement were looking for new approaches to embrace to reinvigorate the 
process of rural development.  In cooperation with the Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of 
Municipalities (NLFM), the NLRDC recommended to the provincial government that a commission 
be established to make recommendations about rural and regional economic development (House, 
2003).  In January, 1994, both the federal and provincial governments announced the formation of a 
Task Force on Community Economic Development in Newfoundland and Labrador.  The Task 
Force was co-chaired by Gordon Slade, Vice-President of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 
(ACOA) and by J. Douglas House, chair of the Economic Recovery Commission (ERC).  Hearings 
were held across the province and an independent research program was also carried out by Task 
Force staff.  The Task Force published its report in the fall of 1994.  The report strongly endorsed a 
community-based economic development model for the province that would create long-term 
prosperity and diversification for rural areas.  As well, the federal and provincial governments 
announced anew agreement, the Strategic Regional Diversification Agreement (SRDA) as the 
principal funding mechanism for implementing the report’s call for new initiatives in regional 
economic development (House, 1999; House, 2003). 
                                                 
10 .  The number of zones was increased to 20 following decisions taken by Clyde Wells and Brian Tobin. 
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Regional economic development refers to development that “is neither top-down nor bottom-up; or, 
rather, it is both at the same time” (House, 2003:235).  In the Newfoundland and Labrador case, 
regional economic development is an attempt to institutionalize a partnership between government 
and the community.  This is achieved by the creation of two entities: economic zones and regional 
economic development boards (REDBs) for each zone.  The Boards, democratically elected, make 
decisions for residents of the economic zone while working with government as a partner with 
respect to funding and other resources. 
 
The approach to regional economic development endorsed in Community Matters includes the 
following principles: 
 
• a renewed commitment to the role of volunteers; 
• sustainability and stewardship; 
• strategic economic planning for each zone; 
• economic development must be market-driven and business-like; 
• the establishment of a strong entrepreneurial culture; 
• the adoption of the knowledge-based economy; 
• a commitment to education and training; 
• modern telecommunications access; 
• accepting the reality of a global economy; 
• partnerships with labour, government, business, the fishery and a recognition of gender equity, 
and 
• government and cabinet support for regional development (Community Matters, 1995:16-17). 
 
An important dimension to the renewal of regional economic development in Newfoundland and 
Labrador in the wake of the Task Force report is the concept of capacity-building.  What is capacity-
building?  The concept embodies the idea that governments should support communities and regions 
to strengthen their ability to initiate economic development locally.  This means providing the tools 
and resources to communities and regions to undertake development projects that will ultimately 
create long-term and permanent job creation.  Capacity-building also includes a number of related 
themes such as empowering local residents to take control of economic development, allowing for 
the modification of existing institutions so that development can be pursued more effectively and 
efficiently, and encouraging grass-roots groups and organizations to get involved directly with 
respect to development policy (House, 2003).   
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There are two dimensions to capacity-building: regional capacity and supportive capacity.  
Regional capacity refers to the capability of each economic zone to launch development 
projects.  The ability to launch projects is dependent upon other variables such as leadership, 
planning, identifying opportunities for new economic activities, strengthening the private 
sector, identifying and mobilizing local sources for venture capital, providing access to 
education and training for local business ventures and changing residents’ identifications 
with their communities to get them to think in regional terms (House, 2003).   
 
Regional capacity-building is the bailiwick of the Regional Economic Development Boards 
(REDBs).  However, the above factors are difficult, if not impossible, to implement without 
supportive capacity from government.  Supportive capacity-building includes the 
mobilization of key federal and provincial institutions to support local regional development 
initiatives.  Examples of such capacity include ACOA, the Department of Human Resources 
Development Canada, Industry Canada, provincial departments and agencies, Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, the College of the North Atlantic, business groups 
(Newfoundland and Labrador Chamber of Commerce), industry groups (Alliance of 
Manufacturers and Exporters), labour unions (FFAW) and other interested parties.  These 
organizations can provide tangible assistance to the REDBs to execute regional capacity-
building (House, 2003).   
 
For the next several years, the lead agency for the implementation of the Task Force report as 
well as the conduit for supportive capacity-building was the ERC.  The ERC worked closely 
with ACOA and the Enterprise Network to put the Task Force’s recommendations in place.  
The provincial Cabinet agreed to place the Enterprise Network (the e-commerce platform for 
regional economic development11) in the same building as the ERC.  As well, Gordon Slade, 
Vice-President of ACOA agreed to move the administration of the SRDA out of ERC 
headquarters.   Many of the key initiatives undertaken by the ERC had as their purpose the 
goal of providing support to the REDBs to carry out their projects and the Commission 
partnered with other government departments and agencies to produce a report on education 
and training with respect to regional economic development (House, 2003).   
 
The evolution of regional economic development was derailed in December, 1995 when 
Premier Clyde Wells announced that he was resigning as leader of the Liberal Party of 
Newfoundland and Labrador.  His replacement, federal Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin, was 
sworn in as Premier in January, 1996 and promptly called an election for February, 1996.  
Sweeping to power, the Tobin administration abolished the ERC and returned to a policy 
concentrating on large-scale resource and mega project economic developments.  The 
REDBs still existed but the amount and level of support from provincial departments and 
agencies remained stagnant.  Tobin himself was more concerned with immediate economic 
benefits to rural Newfoundlanders and Labradorians than trying to devise plans for long-term 
economic prosperity and diversification (House, 2003).   
 
                                                 
11.  For a more detailed discussion of the Enterprise Network, see House, 1999, 
pages 143-149. 
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What are the challenges to regional economic development in Newfoundland and Labrador? 
These are as follows: 
 
• community rivalries within regions; 
• the fall out of the federal government’s handling of the cod crises; 
• the increase in the rate of out migration; 
• the lack of investment funds for the REDBs and 
• mobilization of grass-roots support for regional economic development (House, 2003). 
 
The first challenge has deep roots in Newfoundland history and culture.  Traditionally, 
Newfoundlanders have identified with their village or town rather than a larger region.  This 
is still very much the case as divisions continue to exist between “townies” and “baymen”.  
While conducting interviews with some of the REDB members from Zone 18, community 
rivalry was a major theme with one community development officer saying that people from 
“up the shore” resent the fact that the DITRD office is in Placentia.  One of the major issues 
is the fact that people have not been taught to think in regional terms.  The concept of an 
economic zone is simply foreign to most Newfoundlanders.12  This is important because with 
respect to regional economic development, residents are more likely to identify with new 
initiatives if they are seen as benefiting their particular communities rather than the region as 
a whole. 
 
The federal and to a lesser extent the provincial governments’ handling of the cod mora-
torium created divisions among citizens in many of the economic zones especially among 
those involved with the fishery who qualified for income support versus those who failed to 
do so.  Many persons currently and formerly involved with the fishery have expressed both 
suspicion and frustration with efforts by the REDBs to diversify regional and community 
economies for fear that the fishery will be sacrificed (House, 2003).  The rate of participation 
by those in the fishery on the REDBs is low. 
 
The third challenge focuses on efforts to stem the rise of out migration, especially among 
young people.  At a conference held by the Baccalieu Board of Economic Development 
titled “Where Have All Our People Gone?”, the consensus among participants was that the 
only way to halt increased out migration is economic development in the regions.  However, 
the emphasis on short-term make-work projects will not prevent further population losses in 
rural Newfoundland. 
 
The fourth challenge identified by House is the notion that the REDBs lack the capacity to 
raise and invest their own funds.  As far back as the RCEU report in 1986, it was suggested 
that Boards be given block grants to support long-term economic projects.  However, most 
governments in Canada are reluctant to relinquish control over public money which means 
the Boards do not have the authority to raise and spend their own money.  As well, the idea 
of merging the Boards with the Business Development Corporations was not supported by 
the provincial government with the consequence being that the Boards can identify potential 
                                                 
12.  Interview with Community Development Officer, Avalon Gateway REDB, 
Dunville, NL. 
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projects for development but they can not invest funds to create new or expand existing 
businesses (House, 2003) 
 
The final challenge facing the REDBs is the ability to get local residents involved in regional 
economic development.  My interviews with people involved in the REDB process as well as 
rural economic development confirm that without new blood, current volunteers will burn 
themselves out.13  The Boards will need to appeal to residents to take regional development 
seriously and to have representatives from as many sectors and groups as possible.  
Government efforts to provide support with respect to hiring staff and paying honoraria for 
members would be a good start. 
 
Regionalization and Education Reform 
 
The evolution of the education system in Newfoundland and Labrador has been shaped by 
two forces:  religion and the economy.  Schools in the country and later province were 
organized along denominational lines (Roman Catholic and Protestant) with funds coming 
from government.  Since a crucial source of government revenue was customs duties, 
education funding was not stable and this affected the number of schools constructed and 
was a significant factor limiting teacher salaries (McCann, 1998). 
 
Following Confederation with Canada in 1949, the province adopted a North American 
model of education characterized by a focus on the growth of an urban and industrial society 
with an academic secondary school system leading to enrolment at Memorial University.  
The University was established to create a new middle-class of professionals, politicians and 
civil servants while the Colleges of Trades and Technology (now the College of the North 
Atlantic) delivering vocational and technology programs (McCann, n.d.).  Such a model of 
education came under increasing attack in the 1980s as outmoded and unsuitable for the 
needs of the province.  A key report, Education for Self-Reliance, a supplement to the Royal 
Commission on Unemployment and Employment, argued that there was “a growing 
mismatch between the kind of secondary and post-secondary education system that has 
evolved and the kind of society Newfoundland is becoming” (quoted in McCann, n.d.:5).  
The report concluded that Newfoundland’s education system was not meeting the needs and 
lifestyles of rural and outport residents nor could it address the changing needs created by an 
emerging post-industrial society.  The thrust of the report was founded on the premise that 
education ought to be considered an economic investment whereby the higher the formal 
level of education in the population, the greater the level of economic growth.  Thus, 
education would upgrade human capital with curricula that would be entrepreneurial, 
scientific, flexible and generic (McCann, 1998). 
 
In Change and Challenge, the province’s strategic economic plan, government embraced the 
view of education outlined in Education for Self-Reliance.  The future prosperity of 
Newfoundland and Labrador would be determined by the establishment of a skilled, 
innovative and flexible workforce educated in science, mathematics, computer technology 
                                                 
13.  Interview with Avalon Gateway Regional Economic Development Board 
member, Colinet, NL. 
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and electronics.  The emphasis on skills development at the expense of the humanities and 
social sciences was the result of lobbying by key business groups (the St. John’s Board of 
Trade) who favoured an entrepreneurial format for education combined with the abolition of 
denominational control over schools (McCann, n.d.). 
 
These trends led the Wells government to establish a Royal Commission in 1990 to study the 
possibility of creating a new system of education in the province.  The report, Our Children 
Our Future, made a total of 211 recommendations.  These included: the number of school 
boards be reduced from 27 to nine; that boards be elected by voters rather than appointed by 
the churches; that the role of the churches be limited to pastoral care and religious education 
only; the school year be extended to 200 days; dissolving the three denominational education 
councils, and the establishment of School Councils (Our Children Our Future, 1992). 
 
The Royal Commission emphasized the importance of parental participation in education 
decision-making and school policy.  Not only would board members be elected by voters, 
but parents would be encouraged to audit school performance, have a voice in school policy 
and reward improved performance by schools and teachers through the use of discretionary 
funding (McCann, n.d.). 
 
There were two competing visions of education provided by the Royal Commission.  First, 
the view offered by government, business and the sciences promoted a system based on new 
technologies that would foster competitive and entrepreneurial skills in students.  Second, the 
view put forward by parents, teachers and the public saw the purpose of education as 
providing skills designed to enhance cooperation, citizenship and multiculturalism, an 
emphasis on music and the arts and increased parental participation and control. 
 
Following the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the Wells government sought to 
negotiate with the churches a means of restructuring the school system.  Both the Roman 
Catholic and Pentecostal churches were opposed to this process and had issued a minority 
report in response to the recommendations presented in the Royal Commission.  In 1995, 
Premier Wells called for a referendum on denomination education reform to reform Term 17 
of the Terms of Union between Newfoundland and Canada.  Term 17 guaranteed that 
education in Newfoundland be based on denominational control by the churches.  In 1969, 
the Anglican, United, Presbyterian and Salvation Army churches merged their schools into a 
single entity (integrated schools).  The 1995 referendum called for government to retain 
denominational education but to allow for the reduction in the number of school boards from 
27 to 10.  A majority of voters (55%) endorsed the amendment.  Boards would be elected. 
 
However, the new amendment was confusing as it permitted both uni-denominational and 
inter-denominational schools.  The Roman Catholic and Pentecostal churches challenged the 
results of the referendum and went to court to block any constitutional change to Term 17.  
Premier Tobin, following the decision of Justice Leo Barry in July, 1997, called for a second 
referendum to remove all denominational control over education in Newfoundland and 
Labrador (Department of Education, 2005).  With a turnout of 53%, 73% of voters approved 
the amendment to Term 17.  The power of the churches was removed from education.  In 
2004, government announced a further consolidation in the number of school boards from 11 
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into five.  The rationale was based on declining enrolments and attempts to create 
administrative and managerial efficiencies.  The Minister noted that since 1996-97, 
enrolments have declined by 23 percent and there are 29 percent fewer schools while the 
number of administrators and program staff have remained constant.  The new boards are as 
follows: 
 
• Labrador Board:  16 schools, 4466 students; 
• Western Board:  82 schools, 14, 807 students; 
• Central Board:  75 schools, 14, 752 students; 
• Eastern Board:  127 schools, 44, 756 students, and 
• Conseil Scholaire francophone provincial:  five schools, 204 students (School Board 
Consolidation, 2004). 
 
These new regional entities were larger and no public input was sought by government. 
 
The removal of denominational control over the education system was a major driver of 
reform in Newfoundland and Labrador.  However, an equally powerful driver was eco-
nomics, in particular the increasing costs associated with keeping hundreds of rural and small 
schools open.  The concept of school viability was introduced by the Royal Commission 
report in 1992 and became a key component of the reform process.  What school viability 
was designed to do was to initiate a process for the closure and consolidation of schools and 
allow government to make the best use of declining fiscal resources.  Two attempts to 
operationalize school viability were tried by government.  In the first phase (1995), viability 
was defined in terms of class size.  At the primary and elementary level, a minimum 
enrolment of 20 students was the bench mark for viability.  For a Kindergarten to Grade Six 
school, a total of 140 students had to be enrolled.   
Any school with fewer pupils would be eligible for closure.  The problem with this approach 
is that hundreds of schools in outport Newfoundland would be required to close.  Residents 
in rural districts complained bitterly that a simplistic and quantitative approach by 
government to determine viability was wrong.  As a result of public opinion, government 
retreated from this definition of viability (Mulcahy, 1999).   
 
Government then introduced a revised viability plan whereby a school was required to offer 
a quality program for students regardless of enrollment:  “Regardless of where they live or 
where their children attend school, parents in the Province should be confident that the 
school is able to offer a quality program” (quoted in Mulcahy, 1999:2).   This measure of 
viability was vague.  What is a quality program?  How would it be defined?  For 
government, a quality program meant more than providing the students with the core 
requirements.  For many small rural schools, government argued that it would be more 
beneficial for students to be bussed to larger schools where the quality of program was 
superior to that in their own communities. 
 
The politics of school reform becomes ugly and nasty when government wants to reduce or 
reallocate programs and services.  For citizens in outport Newfoundland, school con-
solidation and closure was regarded as an attack on their ways of life by government.  These 
persons were critical of government’s position on education and did not consider the changes 
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as improvements to the system (Mulcahy, 1999).  Rural voters banded together and 
challenged government’s decision to close their schools.  For rural citizens, community 
schools were considered not only viable but extremely valuable and that the basis of reform 
should be the preservation and improvement of community based schooling (Mulcahy, 
1999).  Rural educators, town councilors, parents, and residents adopted an ecological 
approach to school reform.  Closing a school has huge implications not only for the 
education of children but also for the economy and society.  The decision to close a school 
can not, therefore, be made in isolation from the social, economic and healthy well-being of 
the whole community.  As one rural resident put it,  
 
“Taking a school out of a small community is like taking the heart right out of it.  If you have 
no school, you have no children, no town.  Government must realize that in rural 
Newfoundland, the school is a central institution, and as such, should be developed to impact 
our communities in a positive way towards the future of Newfoundland.  The operation of a 
school provides a focal point for the community, a source of pride (quoted in Mulcahy, 1999: 
7). 
 
Like hospitals and medical facilities, schools are major employers in rural Newfoundland.  
The ability of a community to develop and prosper is often dependent on the presence of a 
community school.  The school functions as a cultural and social anchor for rural 
communities.  However, as Government seeks to reduce its funding commitments through 
the creation of efficiencies in education, it is likely that more schools will be closed. 
 
Finally, we want to comment on the historic lack of parental involvement in the school 
system in Newfoundland and Labrador.  The lack of participation has had enormous affects 
on education.  Newfoundland and Labrador has no tradition of what educators refer to as 
local control over education.  This means that local residents have not, until recently, been 
able to elect a school board which has, in other jurisdictions, the primary authority for public 
schools (Kim, 1997).  School boards in the province, prior to the removal of denominational 
control over education, had a limited role in terms of the education system.  Board areas of 
authority were confined to such items as school maintenance, facilitating the operation of the 
school and reporting what occurs in the school to government.  The lack of local control over 
schools in the province is the result of the power of the churches.  The churches appointed 
members to their educational councils and local residents had no opportunity to discuss 
matters relating to the education of their children (Kim, 1997).  Schools were established by 
the churches, not local residents.  Churches fundraised for the schools thus denying local 
residents the opportunity to assume control over financing.  While the denominational 
schools were publicly funded by government, local residents did not have control over the 
disbursement of funds.  Even in the post-referendum environment, government provides 
funds to the school boards with little accountability to local residents.  We will discuss the 
composition and governance mechanisms of school boards in the next section of the paper. 
 
In conclusion, education reform has been shaped by the forces of religion and the economy.  
The big debates over reform concern the closure and consolidation of schools, especially in 
rural and remote areas of the province.  Education, like economic development and health 
care, has witnessed policy conflicts revolving around the urban-rural cleavage.  However, 
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none of these reforms have occurred within an ecological model; rather, they are independent 
and autonomous of each other.  Notwithstanding the important changes to the education 
system in Newfoundland and Labrador, the province continues to have high rates of illiteracy 
and levels of persons not completing high school.  Table 3 presents summary statistics for 
each of the province’s 20 economic zones with respect to levels of education. 
 
Table 3  Highest Level Of Schooling, 2001 
 
Economic Zone % without High 
School Certifi-
cate 
% with High 
School Certifi-
cate Only 
% with Trades 
or Non-Univer-
sity  
% with some 
University 
Education 
1 50.1 8.3 28.1 13.2 
2 27.8 12.6 38.7 20.9 
3 38.9 7.1 36.9 17.1 
4 44.8 10.0 36.4 8.6 
5 51.8 13.5 24.2 10.4 
6 53.5 8.5 24.1 13.9 
7 59.5 9.4 19.1 12.1 
8 42.2 9.3 28.4 20.0 
9 51.2 8.2 26.5 14.1 
10 59.5 7.2 21.9 11.4 
11 57.0 9.7 22.0 11.3 
12 46.1 10.1 27.9 15.9 
13 58.0 9.9 20.9 11.2 
14 51.7 10.5 24.7 13.1 
15 51.4 10.5 25.8 12.3 
16 50.1 8.2 28.4 13.4 
17 48.5 10.5 26.9 14.1 
18 46.0 7.8 32.4 13.8 
19 29.9 9.0 28.7 32.4 
20 47.6 9.1 28.0 15.3 
Province 42.4 9.4 27.5 20.8 
Canada 31.3 14.1 28.8 25.8 
Note:  Figures may not total 100 due to rounding.  Source:  Newfoundland and Labrador 
Community Accounts. 
 
 
Regionalization and Municipal Government 
 
In our final policy field, regionalization has had the smallest affect on reform.  Significant 
attention to regionalizing the delivery of municipal services began in the mid-1970s largely 
because the Royal Commission on Municipal Government in Newfoundland and Labrador 
identified a need for structural change.  In the mid-1990s, because of government’s attempts 
to integrate policy planning and decision-making through the Strategic Social Plan, 
municipal restructuring along regional lines once again emerged into the limelight.  The 
Minister, in a consultation paper, announced that government would begin to examine other 
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options for the regionalization of municipal service delivery in addition to the already 
existing Regional Council model developed for Fogo Island (The Time for Regionalization, 
1996).  The Regional Council model was created by the Royal Commission on Municipal 
Government in Newfoundland and Labrador and became formally entrenched through the 
Municipalities Act.  This model allows for the creation of a mix of appointed and elected 
representatives to coordinate regional service delivery initiatives among municipalities, to 
provide municipal services and taxation to adjacent unincorporated areas and to explore 
further possibilities for new regional services (The Time for Regionalization, 1996).  The 
model was developed for Fogo Island.  The Island was considered to be a single region 
consisting of four municipalities and four unincorporated areas including three local service 
districts.  The Regional Council has appointed representatives from the four municipalities 
and elected representation for the unincorporated areas. 
 
However, the Minister noted in the consultation paper that the Regional Council model may 
not be appropriate for all areas of the province and that other options needed to be explored.  
Government announced that regionalization would move forward because it would 
ultimately result in municipalities receiving an improved level of services, the ability to 
cultivate a better quality of life, and to provide for social, economic and environmentally 
conscious development.  The key principles guiding the reform of municipal government in 
Newfoundland and Labrador include: 
 
• a clear demarcation of service responsibility between the Province and local 
governments; 
• there needs to be consistency in the province’s approach to the delivery of municipal 
services within incorporated areas as well as between incorporated and 
unincorporated areas; 
• the provincial government endorses the ideas that citizens should contribute finan-
cially to the provision of municipal services provided to communities but also 
recognizes that not all communities are financially able to provide services without 
assistance; 
• the cost and effectiveness of local government services can be improved if there is 
better coordination and joint service arrangements among communities, and 
• coordination can be achieved if there is a formal structure in place at the local or 
regional level (The Time for Regionalization, 1996). 
 
The twenty regional economic zones would be the basis for determining the regional 
groupings across the province for local government service delivery. 
 
Based on the consultation document, government noted it had two choices with respect to 
regionalization of municipal services.  First, the province could be divided into regions 
(based on the existing economic zones) and regional councils could be established through 
legislation for each area.  The second choice would be for government  to encourage 
municipalities to act voluntarily to provide for joint service delivery for adjacent 
communities.  If desired, the communities could then petition government for the 
establishment of a regional council.  Both options are problematic.  As indicated above, the 
regional council model is not appropriate for every part of the province and thus would be 
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difficult to impose upon municipalities.  The second option would likely create a patchwork 
of regional councils where some areas would enthusiastically endorse the idea while others 
may continue to work with the status quo.  The second option would have the advantage of 
support coming from the grassroots of communities rather than being imposed from above 
by the province (The Time for Regionalization, 1996). 
 
A second model for regional service delivery developed in the consultation paper was a 
regional service authority.  This would be a body that would formalize ad hoc arrangements 
in existence or that could exist between municipalities to provide and coordinate services to 
two or more communities within a specific area (The Time for Regionalization, 1996).  This 
model is based, in part, on that of regional services boards.  These are intended to assist the 
delivery of various local services such as water supply, waste management, fire fighting and 
sewage among communities.  This model did not become commonplace across the province.  
Instead, individual communities have been working together to deliver services either jointly 
or on a regional basis.  One current example is the Avalon Waste project.  This is an 
ambitious effort with the goal of merging 43 disposal sites into one location.  This new waste 
site would cover the Avalon peninsula up to Clarenville. The Greater Avalon Waste 
Management Committee acknowledges that municipal governments have legislative 
authority for solid waste management and represent the focal point of impacts caused by the 
introduction of modern waste management practices.  The Committee involves 15 
individuals from areas such as the NLFM, Provincial Government and the municipalities 
throughout the region. The plan is to have the system implemented by 2010 (Tomblin, et.al., 
2005). 
 
The difficulty with respect to implementation is cost, which is expected to be around $200 
million. The committee also needs to ascertain what kind of waste is going into the dumps.  
As it stands the Province’s waste facilities are in horrible condition.  They do not meet 
environmental standards and many of them are located adjacent to small communities.  The 
teepee incinerators are particularly environmentally destructive and they have exceeded their 
recommended lifespan.  To help on the financial side the province is considering increasing 
tipping fees, which are much lower than the rest of Atlantic Canada. 
 
The dumps are a concern for the expanding tourism industry because many are near small 
towns and hiking trails.  The large amounts of rodents at the uncontrolled dumps are also a 
health concern.  The 2001 public consultation found that people in NL would support an 
increase in fees or taxes to help increase green initiatives.  The public consultation also found 
that people are very supportive of regional cooperation in this field as a means to cut costs 
and increase the effectiveness of waste management. 
 
In the consultation paper, government announced that any decision to proceed with regional 
restructuring would require the initiation of feasibility studies for each proposed region.  The 
focus of these studies would be to determine whether a formalized regional municipal 
government institution could deliver the necessary services in a particular areas.  Issues to be 
addressed by the feasibility studies include: 
 
• demographics; 
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• selection of boundaries for regions; 
• the economy and its relationship with the REDB; 
• inventories of community services, commonly provided services and municipal 
infrastructure and equipment; 
• current regional service delivery arrangements (if any); 
• types of services to be delivered in a regional format; 
• funding; 
• governance; 
• administrative structure; 
• property assessments; 
• taxation and user fees, and 
• restructuring options (The Time for Regionalization, 1996). 
 
Government wanted to initiate and implement policy change with respect to municipal 
governance.  Key policy-makers were of the view that regionalization was an appropriate 
and necessary solution to the problem of increasing costs and duplications of services among 
municipalities.  The pan-provincial association representing municipalities across the 
province endorsed government’s objective: 
 
“The potential for rationalization of duplicate or inefficient services is significant 
using a regional approach.  Current inequities associated with service levels pro-
vided to unincorporated communities relative to those that can be provided by their 
incorporated neighbours who need to support such services from locally-derived 
revenues must be rectified.  The climate in which municipalities operate and come 
together in regional cooperation must be opened up to support such local initiatives.  
Local initiative must be encouraged, enabled and promoted:  we are a province of 
survivors and innovators, and as such we do have a future” (quoted in The Time for 
Regionalization, 1996:8). 
 
In 1997 there was a major report on the need for regionalization and the sharing of services.  
The Task Force on Regionalization conducted interviews and seminars with municipal 
officials and the public throughout the province. The Task Force came to the conclusion that 
regionalization was a necessary step that would benefit the province.  The sharing of services 
between rural municipalities was suggested as a potential solution to their problems.  
However, the public was not very supportive.  The Task Force found that the “overwhelming 
response was one of ‘go away, leave us alone, we’re already doing the best we can to share 
with our neighbours (Task Force on Municipal Regionalization, 1997:7-8)”.   
 
The Task Force evaluated several models of regional service delivery for the province using 
the following criteria:  sense of community; balance of interests; adequate financial base; 
economies of scale; regional cooperation; community participation and acceptability and the 
utility of boundaries for other purposes (Task Force on Municipal Regionalization, 1997).  
The model recommended in the Report is a Regional County Services Board.  Each Board 
would be governed by a Board of Directors, some of whom would be appointed by 
municipal councils from among their own members while others would be directly elected 
from unincorporated areas within the Regional County.  The number of Directors and the 
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balance between appointed and elected representatives would vary according to the needs of 
each Regional County.  It was also recommended that each Regional County be given 
jurisdiction over land use planning and solid waste disposal within the County outside of 
municipal boundaries (Task Force on Municipal Regionalization, 1997:9).  Additional areas 
of jurisdiction could be assumed by the Regional Counties on the recommendation of their 
Boards of Directors.  Further, all votes on the Regional County Services Board would require 
a triple ⅔ majority:  ⅔ of the Directors, representing ⅔ of the communities with ⅔ of the 
population.  Directors would be limited to two four year terms and would be subject to recall 
by their constituents or municipal councils. 
 
In recommending the adoption of Regional County Services Boards, the Task Force noted 
the high level of interaction between municipalities and the province’s REDBs.  
Municipalities were among the original groups invited to the table when the REDBs were 
conceived in the early 1990s and municipalities have the highest level of representation on 
the Boards.  The Task Force noted that functions of the REDBs could be strengthened by 
bringing them in line with an elected and accountable regional government:  “The Task 
Force believes that Regional Economic Development Boards can play a major role in 
fostering economic development, but feel that since municipalities are slated to be given 
legislative authority for economic development, greater coordination between the Regional 
Economic Development Boards and a regional municipal authority is necessary” (Task Force 
on Municipal Regionalization, 1997:77).   
 
In conclusion, regionalization has been nearly non-existent with respect to municipal 
restructuring mainly because communities do not desire another level of government and are 
jealous of ceding any power to a neighbour.  Given the lack of a strong tradition of local 
government in Newfoundland and the isolation of many communities due to geography, it is 
difficult to create a regional identity among different communities.  People are strongly local 
in their cultural and political orientations and this acts as a barrier for individuals and groups 
to create regional or meso-level tiers of institutions to provide services or to coordinate 
delivery.  The inability of regional boards, whether health, economic or education in scope, 
to capture citizens’ attention for an attachment to “place” continues to be the main reason 
why this model has not succeeded with respect to policy. 
 
 
PART FOUR:  SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES WITH REGIONALIZATION 
 
The attempts to regionalize service delivery in health care, economic development, education 
and municipal government share a number of commonalities.  These can be evaluated along 
three dimensions:  institutions, ideas and interests.  What kinds of institutions have been 
developed for regionalization in Newfoundland and Labrador?  In the realm of municipal 
government, there are no formal regional institutions.  The recommendations from the Task 
Force on Municipal Regionalization were not adopted by government and the only kind of 
regionalization in place involves voluntary cooperation among communities.  In education, 
school boards continue to have administrative jurisdiction over school maintenance, hiring 
and management.  These boards are the only ones that are elected, in toto, by voters across 
the province.  However, as institutions, school boards lack control over finances, are not 
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permitted to fundraise on a large scale and are often ignored with respect to decision-making.  
The number of school boards has been reduced as the current government desires to reduce 
administrative duplication and save money.  For the regional economic development boards, 
they continue to exist but with little improvement in terms of authority.  While REDB 
members are elected from different constituencies, these entities have seen their budgets 
reduced by government.  For many in rural Newfoundland, there is lack of capacity for 
economic development as different groups, from the old rural development association days 
to federal bureaucrats, jockey for power in shaping decision-making.  As well, government 
has not made the REDBs a key part of their economic development strategy thus reducing 
the ability of these institutions to fulfill their mandate.  House (2003) notes that the following 
changes need to occur to make rural economic development a reality in Newfoundland and 
Labrador: 
 
• political leadership: there must be both leadership from the top and the bottom.  As 
House notes, “Nothing could boost the morale or improve the chances for success of the 
regional boards more than a resounding and authentic vote of support from the premier 
of the province, reinforced by a similar forceful endorsement from Newfoundland’s ... 
cabinet minister” (House, 2003:263). 
 
• clear policy direction for the fishery: the effects of the cod moratorium were devastating 
for rural Newfoundland.  However, House points out that there is a window of 
opportunity to  develop a fisheries policy that is long-term, balanced, sustainable and 
sanctions the appropriate use of technology.  Such a policy would help to stabilize rural 
communities, assist in economic planning and provide a healthy environment for 
individuals. 
 
• decentralization of government decision-making: decisions should be make on the 
ground and in the field rather than at someone’s desk or in a meeting room in a 
downtown St. John’s hotel.  More effort is required to give ACOA and DITRD staff the 
ability to make decisions in the field. 
 
• establishment of a lead agency: there should be one central institutional entity that directs 
and guides regional economic development with appropriate cabinet level support. 
 
• mobilizing non-governmental leadership: groups such as the Board of Trade, Chambers 
of Commerce, labour unions, sectoral groups and academia need to be brought into the 
process of regional economic development as full partners.\ 
 
• building supportive capacity: the REDBs need to given adequate funding so that more 
time can be spent on project development than on fundraising.  Local sources for 
investment capital need to be found and should be established to work in partnership 
with the REDBs. 
 
• outward looking REDBs: “As the once inward-looking Irish have learned only too well, 
you have to be outward-looking to succeed, to grow, to create new wealth, and to 
generate new employment for your people” (House, 2003:265).  The REDBs need to 
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reflect on their own planning in light of the changing national and world economy.  
Activists need to set aside their hostility toward and suspicion of outsiders involved in 
regional economic development.  Young people need to be taught that there are 
opportunities for small business growth in their own communities. 
 
With respect to the regional integrated health authorities, government has handicapped them 
in two areas:  health human resources and needs-based budgeting.  The RIHAs can hire 
doctors, nurses and other health professionals but have no control over wages, salaries and 
fees paid since these are determined by government.  The health authorities have been 
lobbying unsuccessfully to have government implement a needs-based budgeting system for 
health spending rather than the current ministerial envelope funding model.  The health 
authorities do not desire political interference in health funding.  Instead, money needs to be 
allocated on the basis of patient needs in different areas of the province.  Members of the 
health authorities are appointed by government giving the province a degree of control over 
policy as well.  Several of House’s recommendations with respect to economic development 
could easily be applied to education and health care. 
 
The ideas that have driven regionalization in the province focus primarily on cost savings.  
Government saw and continues to endorse regionalization as a solution to rising program and 
administrative costs for service delivery.  Fewer regions means savings in terms of 
administration and management; centralizing health delivery and constructing regional 
feeder schools means a reduction in the number of facilities; volunteer boards mean little or 
no money needs to paid out by government.  The key ideas given birth to regionalization 
focus on how to best respond to political, social and fiscal crises such as the  1992 cod 
moratorium, out of control debt and budget deficits, increasing health costs and widespread 
opposition to tax increases.  Citizen participation has been given lip service by politicians 
and bureaucrats and regionalization in Newfoundland and Labrador has been a province-
centred exercise rather than one emanating from the grassroots level.  For the most part, the 
views of citizens have been ignored in the drive toward regionalization because government 
desires to control the process and policy outcomes. 
 
The interests contending for power within regionalization are limited to those of the elite and 
well funded advocacy groups.  In health, the key interests are doctors, health professionals 
and groups representing the rights of patients with particular afflictions (heart disease; 
autism; arthritis, cancer).  The poor, the mentally ill, and other marginalized groups are 
generally ignored and rendered invisible.  In economic development, competition and 
jealousy among federal and provincial bureaucrats and tensions between and among 
communities have stymied the process and frustrated local groups who seek to preserve their 
municipalities (Dunn, 2003).  In education, middle-class parents’ groups have successfully 
lobbied for keeping schools with French immersion programs opened and for constructing 
new facilities equipped with state of the art class rooms and resources.  The various policy 
communities that exist are exclusive with respect to regionalization, function as separate 
entities in terms of policy-making and usually privilege the interests of urban, especially St. 
John’s, citizens over those of rural voters.  The fault line in Newfoundland politics and 
public policy is the urban-rural divide.  The urban population is growing at the expense of 
rural communities.  Economic prosperity derived from the province’s new found oil wealth 
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appears to be confined to St. John’s and the Avalon Peninsula and hospital services are 
becoming more difficult to access in isolated areas.  For reform to occur and new institutions 
to take shape, this fault line must be erased.  Otherwise, we will have two Newfoundlands: 
one that is relatively prosperous, healthy, well educated with decent municipal services and 
the other poor, economically underdeveloped, dependent on government transfers, aging and 
neither healthy nor well-educated. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Regionalization as a strategy for transformation is widespread in Europe, the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada across both jurisdictions as well as policy fields.  We 
need to recognize it is a very popular model of transformation comparable to globalization, 
or industrialization.  As such, there is much to be gained by understanding these dominant 
ideas are not “inevitable” but rather are constructed through a social, cultural, and political 
struggle.  Regionalization is a contested concept that has different meanings and objectives, 
and it is important to recognize what external market, state elites are producing with respect 
to regional transformations, the outcomes achieved, and the impact these new patterns of 
state-society relations are having on different communities.   In some jurisdictions, 
regionalization in the health care sector is designed to strengthen market forces and weaken 
state regulation.  It provided a backdoor for encouraging experiments in privatization, and 
besides, doctors and drug companies were never constrained by regionalization processes or 
structures anyway.  Such transformations in state-society matter a great deal and if elites 
control the pace and direction of regionalization and have little motivation to worry about the 
future sustainability of communities, the process of change will be rather smooth.  
 
There is much at stake and these competitive silos we have built (which reflect the power 
and capacity of old ideas, institutions, interests) need to be understand and contested but 
based upon NL knowledge and experiences.  The fact that regionalization is as popular as it 
is reflects the power of underlying interests and institutions.  We argue that these are unlikely 
to go away and unless patterns of transformation, regional outcomes, strategies, and 
unintended consequences are understood and debated as part of a larger governance 
structure, it will be very difficult to contest imposed frameworks or build alternative 
strategies.  
 
Our paper focused on evaluating different Newfoundland and Labrador regional experiments 
for the purpose of constructing knowledge about what has been created, the competing 
objectives involved, mechanisms and processes relied upon to make and implement 
decisions, and in the end, whether this has enhanced social learning or produced better 
outcomes.  Our intent is straight-forward: to map out the recent history of regionalization in 
NL, compare these with best regional governance practices, but across policy fields. 
 
When we consider the number of regional experiments in Canada within provinces, or cross-
border level, it is quite remarkable that there has not been more discussion of the pressures 
from both below (social diversity) and above (globalization) that created a sense of crisis and 
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then desire for transformation in the first place.  Nor has there been much discussion about 
how best to proceed on discussions over transformation and who should be involved.  In NL, 
there were different approaches to regionalization competing for influence, but these 
operated in their own isolated and competitive silos.  
 
The pace and direction of transformation for any society, jurisdiction, or policy field will 
ultimately depend on the power of embedded ideas, interests, and institutions connected with 
the old regime.  Much will also depend on whether the old system can be reformed in a way 
that is responsive and incremental.  On the other hand, new radical visions (regional or 
otherwise) will require capacity, partners, and integrated knowledge construction and 
dissemination processes and mechanisms to become institutionalized.  Regionalization is a 
contested concept which reflects competing ideas, interests, and institutions.  In one setting, 
it may be used to justify expert-rule, in another, privatization.  In Alberta, for example, 
regionalization has strengthened privatization.  In Saskatchewan, regionalization has been 
pushed as a way to strengthen collectivism.  
 
In our case-study on NL, our intent is not to narrow the debate over regionalization into 
separate policy fields, but rather, to bring different interests together to discuss new types of 
transformation and forms of resistance- but in a way that allows Newfoundland and Labrador 
citizens themselves to debate alternative options and scenarios that better fit their realities.  
Since regionalization is a contested concept and product of crisis, it provides an opportunity 
for us to construct our own mental map based on our own history, values, and interests.  We 
are not living in Alberta nor Saskatchewan, but unless we fully recognize the fact that these 
regional experiments fall within provincial jurisdiction, there will be little opportunity to 
bring different interests (decision-makers, academics, business, voluntary sector) together for 
the objective of pooling resources, joint problem-definition, innovation, and implementation.   
 
For example, health is a significant part of the provincial economy, and problems of 
maintenance and recruitment are critical for the future of the province.  Given the challenges 
associated with a human-resource, service-based economy, there is a growing need to come 
up with new mechanisms and processes that deal with these new realities but in a way that 
reflects the needs and priorities of  NL.  While regionalization and privatization may be 
popular in Alberta, new ways need to be found to build support for issues of equity and 
social justice.   From our perspective, fragmented regional experiments in NL work against 
the quest to take advantage of openings to build new, more integrated coherent mental maps, 
where business, youth, health officials, volunteers, academics, and decision-makers can 
interact, cooperate, produce and implement coherent regional programs. These internal 
divisions have undermined regional coherence in the province and there is much need for 
constructing new forms of regional integration and interaction.  Rather, than recommending 
a particular model for change, we will discuss some options that might be considered for NL. 
 
Renewing governance based on the current silo-based policy system provides much con-
fusion for the public, academics, decision-makers and does little for promoting a more 
interdisciplinary, transparent, social policy learning framework in NL. Regionalization is a 
strategy designed to deal with the challenges of “interdependence.”  As such, what we faced 
in NL is an issue of multi-level governance, and whether we want to rethink old ideas, 
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interests, formal/informal connections, in a way that is more integrated and interactive.  If a 
new NL regional partnership is built across policy fields, what impacts would this have on 
public-private partnerships within regions, formal systems of representation, knowledge 
construction, and implementation?   
 
Regionalization as we have seen is connected with various objectives and values.  It is also a 
product of globalization, social diversity, and an effort to create new synergies and forms of 
interaction in response to changing circumstance, even a crisis.  In practice, old policy 
boundaries have survived.  Highly decentralized, fragmented policy fields have worked 
against the building of a common regional vision, where different interests could work 
together on issues of private-public partnerships, health restructuring, education, and 
municipal restructuring.   
 
Regionalization is often viewed as a way to develop a niche, build social partnerships, 
knowledge, and capacity linked to a sustainable region.  What is doable or sustainable may 
work differently in dissimilar locations, but the key according to boosters of regional 
governance is to get away from government, pay less attention to formal rules, create new 
synergies, and find ways to link and match public, private, voluntary actors, ideas, and 
institutions.    
 
Viewed historically, NL has had much experience with social diversity as well as globa-
lization.  This is reflected in the history of cottage hospitals, Fisherman’s Protective Union, 
Co-ops, denominational influences, trucking system, and public-private policy experiments 
since 1949.  Conventional policy instruments and fields have worked against new synergies 
and forms of regional integration and interaction.   
 
The current policy-field specific forms of regionalization in NL limit the promotion of 
resources and information sharing essential for building more autonomous regions.  Existing 
public agencies may be reluctant to shift from a more unitary to inter-actionist focus based 
on territorial-jurisdictional considerations.  Or, they may be concerned about the challenges 
of privatization, or challenges of building sufficient public policy capacity in marginal, rural 
regions.  A further complication is that these policy fields often rely upon federal support, 
leadership, and resources for sustainability.  It is evident that these federal conditions 
complicate efforts to effect the building and encouraging of regional diversification.  As a 
result, there has been a tendency to rely upon old province-centred ideas, networks, and 
assumptions about markets, states, and current circumstances. Such an approach has worked 
against efforts to contest power, construct regional partnerships, and find new ways to 
debate, replace, or reform linkages across communities and policy networks based on a 
common regional map.  
 
According to regional planners, integrated, autonomous regional networks construct their 
own knowledge, set their own priorities and rely upon their own mental maps to define 
external challenges, or shape local contexts.  In an era of globalization and social diversity, 
regional reformers argue that there is much to be gained or lost in a period of increasing 
“interdependence,” when the state is in decline and there is an opportunity to reinforce 
regional clustering, new forms of innovation and knowledge dissemination.   
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As we have discussed above, there are various options for transforming regions.  But 
developing strong integrated networks with knowledge, capacity, autonomy, and resources 
required for building common mental maps, interests, and co-operative institutions across 
policy fields requires paying closer attention to different types of partnerships.  For regions 
lacking capacity, a reduced role for government may not be a good idea.  Or, it may be the 
case that certain general services should be centralized, while others devolved to the regions.  
Another option or approach to devolution might involve establishing representative 
institutions at the sub-provincial level (either elected or appointed by civil society) and 
establishing expert-based Commissions to evaluate outcomes.  
 
There are various paths or ways for building community capacity, identity, and sustainable 
regional collectivities with access to economic and political resources required to manage 
future market and state trends.  Since there is clear empirical evidence that regionalization 
and multi-level governance is the way of the future, it seems logical that there would be 
benefits to creating a policy-political context that would facilitate new informal and formal 
interactions among local, regional, provincial, and national stakeholders within NL.  A 
collective regional identity would provide an opportunity to exam resources available across 
policy fields, objectives, and prospects for building sustainable regions relying upon 
partnership formation, new forms of knowledge construction, dissemination, and 
implementation.  Or, if this were not a viable option, alternative scenarios and visions could 
be constructed in the struggle to redefine market-state responsibilities in a new era. 
 
In order to provide a process that is open, transparent, effective, and legitimate, more 
emphasis needs to be placed on finding ways to bring different regional silos together in a 
way that will produce a common perception of reality, and shared priorities and framework 
for action.  It would make sense to arrange regular meetings, interactions, but in a way that is 
cooperative, not competitive, and ensures that best public policy practices are employed.   
 
In Europe, since regionalization does not have a strong institutional base, emphasis has been 
placed on forging and encouraging regional partnerships.  As a result of European 
Commission activities, business and voluntary partners were encouraged to operate within 
policy networks.  These created gaps in knowledge construction and implementation that 
were filled by partners themselves.  As noted by Svensson and Osthol, “The policy networks 
revolving around regional and structural policies are not based on pre-existing domestic and 
sub-national institutions (Svensson and Osthol: 29).”   
 
Accordingly,  
 
“In the process new bodies were set up in addition to already existing national 
institutions such as development agencies, local-, and regional governments and 
councils.  Extra-administrative bodies were created to monitor, evaluate, implement, 
and give input to application schemes for funding (Svensson and Osthol: 29).” 
 
In Canada or even NL, there have been lots of public experiments involving both formal and 
informal mechanisms and processes.  In the medical field, for example, doctors have always 
 43 
enjoyed much autonomy and independence in their role as agents of the state for the delivery 
of certain health services. Notably, there may be differences in voluntary capacity or 
maintenance and recruitment that may need to be considered.  In the health care system, 
urban doctors tend to be paid on a fee-for-service basis, while most rural doctors are salary-
based.  Hence, there may not be one fit or best model for all regions.  
 
Aboriginal governance, Nunavut, Yukon, the Northwest territories, Scottish devolution, 
policy experiments with waiting lists, immigration, even federal-provincial labour 
agreements offer examples of efforts to devolve power and promote collaboration across 
policy fields and jurisdictions.  In Europe, new structures and forms of knowledge have been 
created for the purpose of creating new linkages among societal and government actors.  
Based on a principle of subsidiarity, the intent is to avoid homogenization but still construct 
and institutionalize a common set of values, interests and institutions that are viable.  
Regional partnerships may not be the best approach for every society, but it offers a chance 
to bring together municipal, business, university, health stakeholders, decision-makers 
together to establish common priorities, capacity, and systems of implementation.  As in the 
case with General Development Agreements and other forms of federal finance, such 
experiments do create various challenges with respect to accountability, but these can be 
handed by constructing an evidence-based system of assessment.  For example, waiting list 
reforms are assessed on a constant basis. Despite such challenges, these pale in comparison 
to operating within the current system where regions are divided into policy silos and there 
are few opportunities to encourage policy learning and innovation across sectors or 
incorporate competing perspectives.    
 
Regionalization may require different types of partnerships but there will also be a need for 
strengthening institutional interactions in a way that will encourage policy learning, 
innovation across policy fields and networks.  The creation of a Tri-Council, with repre-
sentation of key institutions and stakeholders would facilitate new forms of integration and 
discussion.  Such an approach should highlight the need for an open and transparent process 
where lines of responsibility and accountability are clearly spelled out.  It would be 
comparable to a Health Council, Atlantic Premier’s Council, or European Council.  It might 
also be a good idea to erect some kind of Commission consisting of experts alone, or in 
partnership with decision-makers and community stakeholders.  Their task would be to 
research outcomes, build partnerships with others to construct coherent regional visions that 
build upon local values and policy traditions.   
 
There are various other possible ways to build institutional support for regions within and 
across embedded state-society divisions.  In the United Kingdom, Scottish Devolution went 
much further than the case of British regions, but this was accommodated.  These 
assymetrical arrangements have had a long history in Canada, as evidence in recent federal-
provincial labour agreements.  One approach to regionalization might consist of building an 
Intrastate structure at the centre (even a second chamber) where appointed or elected officials 
participated in agenda-setting, problem definition, and discussing challenges with 
implementation.  In Germany, the second chamber consists of representatives of the regions 
and these regions are responsible for the implementation of  government programs.  
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Another model (Interstate regionalism) would deal with regional issues by creating strong 
regions that enjoy much autonomy and independence.  Comparable to Canadian federalism, 
regional issues would be dealt with on either a bi-lateral basis with the centre, or at 
intergovernmental meetings.      
 
Predictably, the pace and direction of regionalization will , in the end, depend on the power 
and authority of current silos, and their resistance to devolving power and capacity to the 
regional level.  The polarized and separate regional debates of the past worked against 
constructing a more interconnected set of norms and standards on a regional basis.  If we are 
serious about regionalization then an effort needs to be made to find ways to connect, form 
common mental maps, and find ways to enhance policy learning and innovation.  
 
At the regional level there should be more opportunities for the regions themselves to 
explore alternative scenario, but not based on current policy divisions.  The formation of 
regional partnerships are influenced by factors such as capacity, resources, and policy 
instruments and this may end up either promoting asymmetrical regions or choosing  
alternative frameworks.  
 
What the province can no longer afford is a haphazard, uncoordinated approach to 
regionalization which divides communities into competing silos, and undermines policy 
learning across policy fields.  We need to understand what we have built and find better 
ways to integrate, bring different regional interests together to construct common values, and 
objectives, and then find ways to sort out accountability, monitor and measure outcomes, and 
then have a public debate on what changes are required.  In an era of multiple provincial 
objectives (urban versus rural, efficiency versus efficiency, natural versus human resource, 
etc.) regionalization has emerged as a means to manage costs, while dealing with issues of 
equity and social justice.  Unless or until this is acknowledged, and there is a clear attempt to 
integrate regional debates across policy fields, increase transparency, and create an alternate 
regional system that is legitimate, transparent, and accountable to citizens, regionalization is 
bound to fail.  It may be an experiment worth considering, but much more needs to be done 
to adopt good regional governance practices.   
 
Even if we ignore these calls for change, regionalization will not go away, in fact, it seems to 
be gaining momentum in much of the world, especially Europe and North America.  In this 
sense, it has much in common with modernization.  In the case of Quebec, modernization 
was finally accepted in the 1960’s but it was decided it was time for a “Quiet Revolution” 
and a more democratic, transparent approach to deal with these new realities.  For the most 
part, while there were challenges, Quebec benefited by created a more integrated approach to 
defining and responding to forces of modernization. 
 
Viewed from this angle, unless efforts are made to recognize what has been built and new 
ways are found for promoting new forms of regional integration and interaction, the province 
will miss an opportunity to renew governance based on a learning-based, collaborative 
regional framework that reflects local values and objectives.  The choice is ours, either 
accept imposed systems of regionalization in different policy fields that reflect external and 
elite definitions of problems, or find new ways to construct a more transparent, evidence-
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based regional system that is capable of dealing with new realities but based on a new more 
integrated, democratic, learning-based and decision-making vision.  The world around us is 
complex, but regionalization does not need to be designed to produce separate silo and cells.  
These silos are a reflection of external capacity and power. Constructing common regional 
visions works best when the mechanisms and processes involved are themselves integrated, 
interactive, and cut across organizational boundaries.  Since these are all ultimately province-
centered silos, we need to recognize that much can be done to renew regional governance    It 
is all a matter of choice and creating a context where there is an opportunity to form common 
perceptions, and produce a consensus on NL regional objectives and processes. 
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